

AMIA CASE: ARGENTINIAN PROSECUTOR ALBERTO NISMAN ACCUSED THE IRANIAN REGIME, AND MOHSEN RABBANI IN PARTICULAR, OF INFILTRATING LATIN-AMERICAN COUNTRIES, BUILDING LOCAL CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE STATIONS DESIGNED TO SPONSOR, FOSTER AND EXECUTE TERRORIST ATTACKS, WITHIN THE PRINCIPLES TO EXPORT THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION.

Introduction

For the first time in the Argentine and world judicial history, it has been gathered and substantiated in a judicial file, evidence that proved the steps taken by a terrorist regime, the Islamic Republic of Iran, to infiltrate, for decades, large regions of Latin America, through the establishment of clandestine intelligence stations and operative agents which are used to execute terrorist attacks when the Iranian regime decides so, both directly or through its proxy, the terrorist organization Hezbollah. These actions have been taking place within the so-called “export of the revolution”, which was never masked by Tehran and is, in fact, written in their own constitution.

Throughout a lengthy and very strong indictment of more than 500 pages, released today, the General Prosecutor of the AMIA case, Alberto Nisman, based in countless reports, evidence, testimonies, court and investigative records related to other countries of the region, North America and Europe and rulings of foreign courts against the Iranian regime, was able to corroborate and strengthen with new evidence, the responsibility of the Iranian regime in the AMIA bombing, stressing –in particular- the higher degree of responsibility that Mohsen Rabbani and Samuel Salman El Reda had in the attack, taking into account that both have international arrest warrants and red notices from Interpol. Also, the Prosecutor proved the way in which the fundamentalist terrorism sponsored and financed by Iran operates and hides in Latin America, its networks and operational system.

This intelligence and terrorist network had already caused devastating consequences in Argentina in 1994 and almost strike again in the United States in 2007, when the blowing of fuel pipes and tanks of “John F. Kennedy” New York’s International Airport was dodged by the timely intervention of US law enforcements agencies, which –in this case- led to the arrest of the plotters and their conviction to life imprisonment. Several of those terrorist were veteran Iranian intelligence agents that were active in the region. Among them was Guyanese citizen Abdul Kadir, whose importance lays in his close relationship and hierarchical subordination to Mohsen Rabbani.

Throughout the investigation have emerged strong traces of identical situations, this is to say, the establishment of intelligence bases and centers with clear operative capability to execute terrorist attacks, which could be replicating in several Central and South American countries and – according to what has been proved by the prosecution - represented and still does -no more and no less- the expression of a radical Iranian policy which has persisted unaltered for years and entails the dual use of diplomatic representations and cultural, religious and charity associations, in order to conceal illegal activities and objectives behind their legitimacy.

Such discoveries entitled Mr. Nisman, in compliance with judicial assistance and international cooperation agreements and also with counterterrorism and human rights treaties ratified by the Argentinian State, to send copies of this indictment to the pertinent judicial authorities of Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, Guyana, Trinidad & Tobago and Suriname, since several pieces of evidence suggested that certain aspects of the Iranian criminal plan could be taking place within their territories. Also, a copy will be sent to the USA authorities within the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty signed between both countries.

This new evidence incorporated to this investigation clearly shows that the AMIA bombing –beyond the motivations explained in Mr. Nisman’s indictment of 2006, that is, the disruption in the supply of nuclear material to the Islamic Republic of Iran- took place while Latin America was being strongly and aggressively infiltrated by

Iran. In other words, the AMIA bombing did not constitute an isolated event and – therefore- it must not be conceived as a single picture. It has to be investigated and understood as a segment in a larger sequence, a part of a bigger image, where the terrorist attack that took place in Argentina, although dramatically relevant, constitutes a piece that requires a deeper knowledge of its context to be properly understood and unraveled. These conclusions are linked to the words of the First Commander of the Revolutionary Guards Corps, Javad Mansouri: “*Our revolution can only be exported with grenades and explosives*”.

It was demonstrated that in 1982 an important seminar was held in the Islamic Republic of Iran, attended by approximately 380 religious men from 70 different countries. This meeting was a turning point on the regime’s method to export the revolution, understood as the cultural, political and religious infiltration promoted to expand a radical and violent vision of Islam. In the seminar, it was concluded that the regime would use violence and terrorism to reach its expansionist objectives. And that is why Javad Mansouri called to turn each Iranian embassy into an intelligence center and a base to export the revolution.

This had special influence in what Mohsen Rabbani describes as an unexplored land with plenty of possibilities for the Iranian regime, in obvious reference to Latin America. As a consequence of what have been decided in the 1982 seminar, many relevant appointments were made the following year. In 1984 the mullah Mohammad Tabataei Einaki was sent to Brazil, from where he was expelled because of his involvement and links with the terrorist organization Hezbollah. In 1983, the Islamic Republic of Iran accepted Abdul Kadir as its agent in Guyana, who ended up convicted for the terrorist conspiracy to attack New York’s Airport. And also in 1983 the regime sent Mohsen Rabbani to settle in Argentina who, many years later, ended up seriously involved in the AMIA bombing.

Despite the Iranian involvement in the terrorist conspiracy to attack the New York airport, the crucial issue in this matter –based on the documents seized and shared with this investigation by the US judicial authorities- is the remarkable

resemblance in the building and development of the intelligence and infiltration structures established in Argentina and Guyana since 1983, according to Tehran's guidelines. That is to say, there is a distinctive feature within the terrorist pattern created by the Ayatollah's regime, which is characterized by the dual use of diplomatic offices, cultural or charity associations and even mosques, as it was forewarned by the United Nations itself in General Assembly Resolution n° 51/210 (1996).

The intelligence and infiltration station fostered and financed by the Iranian regime had an important role in the AMIA bombing and, in this new indictment, it has been investigated, analyzed in its full dimension and documented with the most solid evidence.

This intelligence structure presented itself segmented in links: the embassy fulfilled its protocol and consular functions; mosques were in charge of religious activities and the local Muslim community received all these joint efforts. However, a deeply and more detailed scrutiny revealed the illegal side of this very same structure, which remained hidden under the legitimacy of the activities referred before. So, embassies fulfilled a protection function by providing legal coverage and diplomatic immunity, they were ideal information exchange channels and also monitored eventual reactions of the local government. Mosques were used by the Iranian local leaders as recruitment centers, in search of people with alike radical ideas. Under these guidelines Mohsen Rabbani used the Embassy, the Cultural Attaché' Office, many people who attended "At Tauhid", "Al Iman" (Cañuelas) and "El Martir" (San Miguel de Tucumán) Mosques, the "front companies" such as Imanco and GTC, and indoctrinated local followers with his fundamentalist ideas, in order to make them functional to the regime's objectives.

Besides revealing the characteristics of the Iranian infiltration method, in the AMIA file there are copies of foreign judicial rulings from cases investigated and judged in Germany, France, Switzerland, among others, which jointly with the conclusions of this new indictment, had allowed to document recurrent similar actions of infiltration, violence and terrorism in different countries and regions, which

constitute nothing else but the expression and materialization of an Iranian regime's policy that has remained unaltered for years.

From the assessment of the evidence gathered and detailed in this indictment have emerged strong traces that in several Central and South American countries, such as Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, Guyana, Trinidad & Tobago and Suriname, activities alike those which were undertaken in our country before the 1994's attack could be carried out in those states, even with different degrees of development. These considerations have prompted the General Prosecutor in the AMIA case, in compliance with international commitments assumed by Argentina in matters of judicial assistance, international cooperation, counterterrorism and human rights, to send copies of this indictment to the pertinent judicial authorities of those countries.

Summary

Delving deeper into the investigation and the measures aimed towards the capture of the AMIA Case's fugitives, it was detected, in July 2010, the existence of a criminal case before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Brooklyn), in which several defendants were being prosecuted for conspiring to commit a terrorist attack against the John F. Kennedy airport. The information pointed out that one of them, Abdul Kadir, had repeated contacts with Mohsen Rabbani, principal architect of the local connection in the AMIA bombing with an international arrest warrant and red notice by Interpol.

This circumstance immediately motivated the Prosecution Investigation Unit of the AMIA case to contact the US judicial authorities in order to start an information exchange to obtain evidence linked to the person and activities of Mohsen Rabbani. Mainly, the deepening of this investigative line had the purpose to establish the knowledge Abdul Kadir and his acquaintances could have had about the terrorist bombing to the AMIA Center and Rabbani's involvement in it, especially considering that, from the beginning of this new inquiry, it was known that the contacts between Rabbani and Kadir were contemporary to the July 18th blast.

Although initially it was examined the possibility of any kind of involvement of Abdul Kadir himself and his acquaintances in the AMIA bombing, that hypothesis had not been supported by any evidence collected until now, which therefore entitled this office to produce certain investigative measures, given the proven relations between Kadir and Rabbani.

Along this line, besides the testimonies taken by the Prosecutor's Office under the Argentina-United States Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, this Unit also received copies of substantial documents seized by the Guyanese Law Enforcement Agencies in the searches conducted in Kadir's residence as well as those obtained by the Trinidadian authorities when he was arrested. In those searches, as it was corroborated while taking testimony to the FBI agent Robert Addonizio, there were seized, among

other important documents, letters addressed to Mohsen Rabbani, newspapers articles that mention At Tauhid mosque -formerly run by Mohsen Rabbani- and a Kadir's personal phone book with Rabbani's contact information handwritten in it.

From the beginning it is worth mention that the study of circumstances and the context in which this conspiracy took place, revealed common patterns between the activities performed by Kadir in Guyana and those developed by Rabbani in Argentina. It became evident that in the Caribbean nation had been settled the same Iranian intelligence infiltration system as it was in Argentina, consisting of many stages, interactive and complex links, for example: the arrival of Iranian Mullahs with a radicalized vision, propaganda and ideological infiltration according to that vision, recruiting and training of local Muslims and new converts, funding, dual use of mosques, cultural centers and Iranian diplomacy, etc. The characteristics identified in Guyana are similar to those that have already been detected in our country and were widely detailed and explained in the October 25th 2006 indictment. Despite the fact that Guyana and Argentina are two far distant and extremely different countries, the building and development of both Iranian intelligence stations showed remarkable resemblance, resulting in the need to deepen even more the investigation to further the study of the context in which AMIA bombing occurred.

This new evidence, jointly analyzed with the probing elements that were already part of this investigation, showed that this intelligence structures had a single and unique leadership, which allows to conclude that they had been preconceived, that means, they were not the result of the free will of the local leaders– Rabbani and Kadir – who were means that executed a previously shaped idea. The origins and unique features that characterized these structures allowed associating them inescapably with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

So, it is possible to state that the Iranian Intelligence structures discovered in Argentina as well as in Guyana – which were suitable to provide essential support for the deadly terrorist attack of 1994 and the dangerous conspiracy of 2007- were not only

very similar in its components, ways of implementation and purpose, but they were also conceived within the framework of the policy for exporting the revolution.

The Prosecution Unit was able to demonstrate that the seminar held in Teheran in 1982 on the subject of the ideal Islamic government, which was attended by approximately 380 religious men from 70 countries, was a turning point on the regime's policy for exporting the revolution which included, since then, the use of violence and terrorism when necessary. In other words, that seminar meant for the Iranian leadership the birth of a justification for the use of violence as an admitted and even promoted way for removing the obstacles that could be found in spreading their radical vision. That was stated, among others, by the First Commander of Revolutionary Guard Corps, Javad Mansouri, who declared: "*Our Revolution can only be exported by grenades and explosives*", and subsequently summoned each Iranian Embassy to turn into an intelligence center and a base to export the Revolution.

The prosecutor explained the backgrounds that made the seminar possible, noting that in October 1980 it was created the Organization of Islamic Liberation Movements (OILM) which started to operate as the real machinery for exporting the revolution. Its leader, Mehdi Hashemi, was appointed Commander of a special unit within the Revolutionary Guard Corps (Pasdaran) and from that position he started organizing a structure which contained warfare guerrilla units, initially including Saddam Hussein's Iraqi dissidents who, at that time, were refugees in Iran. In a short period, the OILM reached a spectacular development becoming the leader in exporting the Islamic Revolution. Since the beginning of OILM's activities, a department called "Studies and Investigations Unit" was exclusively devoted to analyze foreign situations so as to export the Revolution.

After the 1982 seminar it became clear that, in order to achieve its expansionist objectives, the Iranian regime considered the possibility of using violence and terrorism if necessary. Those guidelines were put into practice by establishing intelligence and espionage structures in third countries with the sufficient capability to provide support for terrorist operations.

The expansionist ambitions of the regime became evident in one of the statements of the Iranian leader Ali Larijani, Minister of Culture during Rafsanjani's government, former President of the Iranian Parliament, appointed negotiator by the Supreme Leader Khamenei to deal with western countries in the nuclear topic, member of the National Security Superior Council and one of the most well-known academic of the Islamic nation. He said: *"Why do I think that we should not restrict ourselves to our territory? Because, in this world, we do not represent only an Islamic power but also we are on the Supreme Leader's land— both in Imam Khomeini and Ayatollah Khamenei's times. Until this responsibility is acknowledged by the Muslim world, this last one will be obliged to submit to her [Supreme Leader's Land]. And until our land is that of the Supreme Leader of Islam, we will be responsible for the whole Muslim nation"*.

Theory led to practice. Few months after the seminar, the Islamic Republic of Iran sent Mohsen Rabbani to settle in Argentina (whose activities ended up with his involvement in the AMIA bombing); accepted Abdul Kadir as its agent in Guyana (which turned out to be involved in the conspiracy to attack JFK airport); and sent Mohammad Tabatabaei Einaki to Brazil, from where he was expelled because of his involvement in political activities incompatible with the role he had declared to perform.

An specific example that the Iranian activities in South America dated back to those days, is a report sent to Iran by Rabbani from Argentina, which stated: *"According to our Islamic point of view, Latin America is for us and the international world, a virgin area, that unfortunately, till now, its huge potential has not been taken into account by the Islamic people of Iran. (...) we have a solid support against the imperialism and Zionism intrigues, being an important aid in favor of our presence in the area"*.

It's clear that since his arrival to Argentina, Rabbani was the spokesman of the hardest line inside the Iranian Regime. The economic capacity that he showed during his years in Argentina; the control and dual use of Shiite mosques in this country; the administration of communication media dedicated to Islamic culture; the

authority over a group of loyalists to the project (“antennas”) and the support that he received from the Iranian diplomacy in Argentina; were the pillars that, without any doubt, allowed this radical leader to build an intelligence structure according to the strategy conceived by the Islamic Republic of Iran and take advantage of its resources in case the instructions of the “export of the revolution” demanded extreme methods, as it occurred in our country. In that way, the Iranian expansionist program gained foothold in Argentina.

In this sense must be understood the Iranian infiltration in Guyana and other Caribbean countries, due to the labor of one of Rabbani’s disciple: Abdul Kadir, former Mayor of Linden and former national congressman. This intelligence agent, trained and supported by Iran, established in his country an intelligence structure, strikingly similar to the one built by Rabbani in Buenos Aires, which served the regime’s interests. His work constituted a fundamental support to another act of international terrorism: the conspiracy to attack JFK airport in New York, for which Kadir was convicted to life imprisonment.

In this indictment it was proven that Abdul Kadir had covered a similar route to the one treaded by Mohsen Rabbani in our country. It was established that in 1983, due to some initial contacts, Kadir managed to travel to the Islamic Republic of Iran, with the declared purpose of making himself available for the requirements of the Islamic revolution. According to the evidence, at his return from Iran, Kadir became the regime’s referent in his home country. Then a process of political and religious settlement began, in which the building of the necessary bases for exporting the Islamic Revolution was the essential objective. At this point, it is worth to mention the relationship he started with Morteza Tavasoli, back in those days Iranian ambassador in Venezuela and Kadir’s first regional contact, who assisted him in the propagation of the fundamentalist vision emanated from Iran.

Kadir was already working for Iran and, at that time, his relationship with the regime was conducted through the Iranian Ambassador in Venezuela. It is worth to say Guyana did not have an Iranian diplomatic representation within its borders.

Attached to the file there are intelligence reports that Kadir addressed to Tavasoli in which he explained political, economic and social developments of Guyana, he made references of the characteristics of the Guyanese Armed Forces as well as the security agencies and, basically, he detailed the correlating forces within the Guyanese and neighboring countries' Muslim community.

Other evidence showed that since the 90's there was a direct relationship between Rabbani and Kadir in which the second was subordinated. That dependency reflected the trust that Rabbani, as the Iranian regional leader for exporting the revolution in Latin America, had in Kadir, showing the real interest of Iran in improving the Islamic radicalized movement in this region.

So, this agent responsible of spreading extremism in Guyana and in neighboring countries, recruited individuals who shared the regime's ideology and used the religious propagation to cover illegal activities, for example by preparing several intelligence reports and elaborating a "Five Year Development Plan", in which he conceived the infiltration of Guyanese armed, police and special security forces, governmental agencies, the obtaining of multiple citizenships and document's forgery, devising the indispensable ways and means to facilitate the establishment of an intelligent station with the characteristics promoted by Teheran.

Moreover, through the "Islamic Information Center of Guyana", which he founded and directed, and from his position as representative of the Secretariat of the Islamic Caribbean Movement, he was able to spread his preaches from Guyana to other nations, such as Trinidad and Tobago, Dominica, Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, Suriname and Grenada. This became evident in the statement of Steven Francis – confidential informant infiltrated in Kadir's terrorist cell, who registered many conversations of the plotters-, when he testified that Kadir and his acquaintances: *"(...) were on the path to revolution; they were creating an organization; they were seeking to emulate Hezbollah. They wanted to form an organization like Hezbollah in the Caribbean, with its ideology. Kadir's ideological level was very high, very convinced, he had studied a lot.(...) They wanted to extend throughout the continent. They could*

resort to violent methods if it were necessary to achieve their objective. Their ideology was violent, they were going to establish themselves by any means, even by force.”

So, in the indictment is demonstrated the way in which the Islamic Republic of Iran, throughout the years, made significant improvement in the training and in the ideological, logistical and financial support provided to Kadir which allowed him to proceed, in the way he actually did, that is, becoming involved in a plot to carry out a terrorist attack of a huge and unpredictable magnitude.

In sum, the radical ideas inspired by the Iranian leaders ended up shaping a terrorist with ideal conditions to achieve their violent objectives and to carry out a terrorist attack like the one planned against the JFK airport which, as the US prosecutors stated, could have been similar or even worse than the 9/11 Twin Towers attack.

In this presentation it has also been explained how, early in 2007, Kadir was contacted to be part of the conspiracy to attack the JFK airport of New York City and that his contribution to draft the final plan was extremely valuable. As an example of this, it is worth mention his recommendations about the quantity and type of explosives that should be used in the attack (it must be noted that he was a civil engineer with a long career and experience in the mining industry) and his approval to use the bank account that he used to raise funds for building a mosque in Guyana, so as to hide the incoming money for the terrorist plot. This last example shows, once again, the way in which the Iranian agents operate by concealing illegal actions under religious activities, in this specific case connected to a terrorist plot.

In this petition, it has also been proved that the Iranian authorities not only had been informed of the plan to attack “John F. Kennedy” Airport, but they appear to be seriously involved in this operation, which entails a greater implication. A proof of this, among other evidence, is the statement of Steven Francis who declared that Abdul Kadir has explicitly referred that his contacts in Iran and in the Iranian Embassy of Venezuela said that they were already developing their own plan to attack New York’s Airport, but –eventually- it was decided to pursue Russell Defreitas’ plan. Concretely, he said that *“there were people already looking into this activity and to the attack of*

JFK....there were people looking already into this matter but it was not to the extent of the knowledge displayed by Sheik Muhammed”, that is, Defreitas. It is clear enough to say that Russell Defreita’s plan was considered a better plan compared to the one already in sight of Iran, which also would explain Kadir’s sudden departure to Iran to finalize details of the attack.

Regarding Kadir, he was arrested precisely while being on his way to the Islamic Republic of Iran, where he was going to finalize details of their criminal plan. That is the reason why Salim, one of Kadir’s sons, had communicated with his contacts in Iran to obtain assistance for his arrested father.

Iran’s involvement was necessary because its revolutionary leadership was going to provide the financial support and the fatwa, that is, the religious order that authorized the attack. Francis explains in his testimony, the plotters’ need to obtain the ruling from a religious leader who must order the execution of the terrorist act.

This need explains why the plotters had decided to send a trusted person to Iran in order to meet with the leaders of the Iranian revolutionary movement and, thus, further the terrorist plan. In the trial of another plotter, Kareem Ibrahiim, US Attorney’s Office –Eastern District of New York- pointed out that the conspirators had agreed to “contact the person with the highest rank inside Iran’s revolutionary movement”. In addition, the person sent to Iran would travel pretending to be in a pilgrimage to Mecca; this is to say, it was agreed that in order to send an envoy to Iran to further the terrorist plan, it was convenient to include that person in the Hajj or Umrah pilgrimages, as a way to avoid scrutiny or suspicions from international security agencies or authorities. This is the reason why the group created the code “Hajj or Umrah travel”.

Those facts were confirmed by Kareem Ibrahiim himself who, in his testimony before court, stated that when they made references about sending Salim to Umrah, actually it was a code they created to refer to his journey to Iran in order to further their terrorist plan. Moreover, in the conversations registered by the F.B.I. there are references about the idea to hide the trip to Iran under a pretense pilgrimage to Mecca.

Finally, it must be stated that from Defreitas' point of view, Kadir was very important to the plot, not only because he was a successful leader, but also due to his deeply rooted connections with Iran and its embassy in Venezuela. This assessment was accurate because, as it has been analyzed by the Prosecutor, the introduction of Kadir to the plot not only meant the inclusion of a man, but also of a complete logistic, operative and economic structure controlled by Iran, with the specific capacity to facilitate and successfully execute a terrorist attack.

Therefore, the dual use of cultural and religious activities was present in the conspiracy to attack the JFK airport. As an example of this, it can be mentioned the pretense of a pilgrimage to Mecca to cover the real intention to travel to Iran to pitch the terrorist plot; secondly, the use of a bank account opened to collect funds for the building of a mosque in order to conceal the financing of a terrorist act. A third example, is revealed by the decision to use the funds collected for charity by voluntary donations of Muslims, with the purpose of financing the passport expenses of the person sent to Iran to pitch the terrorist plot. Moreover, Kadir had developed a "five year plan" which included both the need to create programs of madrazas as well as the infiltration of security forces and document's forgery. Finally, it must be mentioned that the conspirators of the attack the JFK airport used the mosque of Guyana as suitable place for exchanging information related to the plan.

The detailed analysis of Kadir's activities in Guyana and in the Caribbean under Iranian directions showed the way in which the Islamic Republic of Iran had spread its strategy of cultural, religious and ideological infiltration in our region. It is not a coincidence that in two countries with utterly dissimilar idiosyncrasies, like Argentina and Guyana, the routes covered by both Iranian agents (Rabbani and Kadir) had been almost identical. Thus, there is a correspondence in the beginning of their activities, the financing and indoctrination provided by the Iranian regime, the indivisible fusion between politics and religion, an intense activity aimed to recruit and train supporters of their fundamentalist vision, the preparation and submission of intelligence reports and the dual use of mosques, cultural centers and embassies in order

to establish an intelligence station, avoiding to arouse suspicion within local law enforcement authorities.

Such coincidences can only be explained due to their common origin, that is, the exporting of the revolution policy that, under a religious and cultural cover, foresees the infiltration of third countries. Since the 1982 seminary, this infiltration was materialized in an intelligence structure that, under the cover of cultural and religious promotion and diplomatic and/or commercial activities, would be able to provide operative and logistical support to terrorist actions, if necessary. That is what precisely happened in Argentina in 1994 and in Guyana in 2007.

Dual use of institutions related to the Iranian regime

The cultural and religious coverage to hide illegal actions turned to be a milestone of the infiltration strategy developed by Teheran. Precisely, the investigation of this case uncovered the use of legal activities, as for example the cultural and religious diffusion and commercial and diplomatic activities, as a cover for intelligence tasks and, mainly, it evidenced the fact that this duality paved the way for the establishment of Iranian espionage structures that, if necessary, are able to facilitate and support terrorist acts. In sum, during the course of the investigation it was possible to collect different probing elements that showed a methodology which consist in the use of legitimate activities to hide criminal objectives and actions.

This methodology was not limited to South America. Thus, in the former Federal Republic of Germany, Kazem Darabi, who occupied a similar position to the one hold by Sheik Rabbani in Argentina, had also been implicated in criminal activities, when he participated in the murder of four Iranian dissidents committed in September, 1992, in Berlin by order of the then Islamic Republic of Iran government (known as “Mykonos case”).

This has been highlighted by the Higher Regional Court of Berlin, who affirmed in its ruling: *“Under the veil of a religious activity, he made contact with his fundamentalist fellows of Lebanese origin and verified their ideas and levels of trust. These qualities allowed Darabi, both personally and logistically, to organize the attack against the representatives of the DPK-I in Berlin, with such a detail that the act could be executed with the support of other forces from Iran, with a high level of success probability and with the lowest risk of being discovered”*.

Not less important is the fact that Kazem Darabi, who took advantage of his religious position to connect the different participants of the “Mykonos case”, was arrested by the German police and convicted to life imprisonment by the judiciary of that country. This constituted a true lesson for the Iranian authorities who had ordered the assassination of their opponents. So, for the AMIA bombing, they decided deliberately and with premeditation to protect from justice their agent in Argentina, by granting Mohsen Rabbani diplomatic immunity designating him Cultural Attaché of the Iranian Embassy, four months before the attack.

In this same line should be read the dual use of Islamic centers, as it has been exposed by the French judiciary, regarding the murder of the former Iranian Prime Minister Chapour Bakthiar, when affirmed: *“Jaffar JALALI arrives to France in 1980 as a student; he rapidly calls the attention for his political-religious fanaticism. In 1981 he becomes an employee of the Iranian Embassy in Paris (...). In 1983, as Political Commissar at the Embassy, he actively participated of the Khomeinist propaganda from the Iranian Cultural Center in Paris (...) and exercised an “intense information activity” about the movements led by Chapour Bakthiar”*.

This matter can be perfectly noticed, once again, in the “Mykonos case”, not only for the categorical statements of the pronouncement but especially for the authority that rules the matter, the Higher Regional Court of Berlin. While studying Kazem Darabi’s activities – identified as the “local connection” of that terrorist act -, the Berlin’s Court detected this duality by declaring that the Islamic Center of Berlin *“functions, in a similar way as the Islamic Center of Hamburg, for the diffusion of the*

Islamic thought in the sense of an authoritarian “State-God” and for the recollection of intelligence information...”.-

Hans Vorbeck, Government Director of the former Federal Republic of Germany and expert in the terrorism, when asked about the investigation of the “Mykonos case”, revealed that the Islamic centers, mosques and businesses of its followers were the meeting points of Hezbollah members.

In addition, Bernard Millerat, then Chief of the Middle East Department of the “*Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire*” (DST), Ministry of Home Affairs, informed, on September 3rd 1997, that his department detected Iranian intelligence elements in the Islamic Center of Paris, when assessing the patterns of the different crimes in which it had been proved the participation of Islamic fundamentalist extremists.

The same duality, but in reference to mosques, has been publicly proclaimed by one of the top leaders of the Iranian Revolution, the Ayatollah Montazeri, who stated that mosques should not only be centers of praying but also centers of cultural, political and military activity. In fact, Mohsen Rabbani, in charge of the “At Tauhid” mosque of Buenos Aires, used this institution to spread fundamentalism. Even, one of his acquaintances, without being an expert in international security affairs or having any particular study on Islamic religion, was able to notice the Iranian agents double game and therefore he mentioned that Rabbani’s religious activity was a “mask”.

Furthermore, the qualified witness Abolghasem Mesbahi said: “*Regarding the transfer of information, religious ceremonies or cultural meetings are generally used in order to hand over a telephone number, for example*”.

Embassies follow this same pattern. Former Iranian President, Abolhassan Bani Sadr, declared: “*In the countries where Iran conducts terrorist operations, most of the embassies members are Iranian intelligence service agents, VEVAK, or from the Revolutionary Guards*”.

Also, the testimonies of the Iranian dissidents Ahmad Reza Ahmadi and Hamid Reza Eshagi, stated that the Iranian Ministry of Information relies directly on the embassies; that most of the first and second Secretaries are agents of the Ministry of Information and that they change their names at the moment of being designated, hence, their real identities are not the one declared in their passports.

Jean Louis Bruguière, former Paris Judge, competent in terrorism, pointed out: *“In each Iranian embassy there are members of the VEVAK, some of them officially and others, clandestinely”*.

Furthermore, Roland Chatelain - Swiss Judge who investigated the murder of the Iranian dissident Kazem Radjavi – stated: *“There is a clear coordination between the Quds Force leaded by Vahidi, the Minister of Intelligence and Security leaded by Fallahijan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ambassadors”*. He explained the structure as follows: *“The Quds Force was in charge of the terrorist operations, the embassy provided the logistics and the Ministry of Intelligence distributed the information collected after the reconnaissance missions”*.

Precisely, this interaction between different Iranian agencies was highlighted by the Great Britain Parliamentary Human Rights Group in its report of June 1996 when asserted that: *“The planning and execution of terrorists bombings are not, as it has been suggested, a separate activity of Iranian groups but it is an activity coordinated from the Intelligence Department, which operates in the Iranian regime president’s office. This department has been created and leaded by Rafsanjani when he was elected president (...) determines who will be the selected assassination target”*. In another part of their report, they stressed that if the plan is assigned to the Al Quds Force, its leader programs a meeting to plan the details of the operation, and then the results are sent again to the intelligence department, from where a note is sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs describing the level of collaboration they will need, including passports, visas and budget. The Iranian Embassy of the chosen country is informed and the operative groups contact certain persons within the embassy who are in charge of receiving the message.

In words of Matthew Levitt: “Iran definitely sees the use of violence and terrorism as a legitimate means of furthering its foreign policy objectives”.

Without intending to conclude the matter, it will be quoted the former Iranian Ministry of Education, Manouchehr Ganji, who clearly stated that “*the Islamic Revolution has constantly maintained that they would carry out terrorists operations abroad, it was never a secret*”.

All these assertions made by courts, judges, experts and former Iranian leaders about the dual use of religion, culture and Iranian diplomacy to cover intelligence operations and even for planning terrorist bombings, though they are concluding, are not new, since the United Nations (UN) had already warned about the dual use of institutions when, in the resolution 51/210 of December 17th, 1996 noted the improper use of “*organizations, groups or associations, including those with charitable, social or cultural goals, by terrorists who use them as a cover for their own activities*”.

At this point it should be stressed that not every cultural or religious diffusion, every diplomatic activities and/or social and educative promotion are meant to cover terrorism. Such an absurd conclusion could damage legitimate and valuable activities, threatening essential liberties of the actual law system. Attention must be paid only when the legitimacy of such activities is used to conceal illegal acts that can potentially end up in intelligence operations or any form of terrorism.

The prosecutor made clear that his office has always been aware of the importance of religious issues, indicating that the conclusions arrived in all of his indictments have nothing to do neither with the Islamic faith nor with people who professes that religion. These pronouncements only intended to point out both the criminal responsibilities of specific individuals and the improper use of legitimate institutions that have been related, one way or another, to the radical and extremist vision of the Iranian regime.

In sum, the reiterated and similar behavior of Iranian agents verified in different parts of the world, evidenced common patterns of action, which excluded any isolated consideration. So, it is the manifestation of a policy that has remained unaltered

for years, characterized by the activities of religious leaders in third countries - supported by embassies, mosques and cultural centers – whose goals are to infiltrate the local community and build an intelligence station with capability to facilitate and support terrorist acts that the Iranian regime eventually decides to perpetrate.

Qom schools

The proselytism developed by Iranian extremists aimed at the recruitment and/or conversion of individuals to their principles. Its final goal is to coopt those who are easily influenced by the regimen's interests, so they can be functional to perform activities required by the intelligence station. This has been stated by Abolghasem Mesbahi: *“The religious activity of the Mullahs consists in doing infiltration work in the local communities, surveillance of dissidents and recruitment of people that will be used in the future and who may even kill in the name of religion”*.

Thus, Rabbani distorted his role of religious educator in order to transmit extremists' ideas to the students who attended his classes. This has been proved by the statements made by a witness who asserted: *“... during the year 1990, three students told him that Rabbani had explained to them that they should export the Revolution and told them ‘everybody is Hezbollah’ (...) Rabbani made these statements to his students as part of the indoctrination imparted during their study. The witness added that Rabbani carried out this indoctrination with all the students that attended the mosque. The meaning of the expression ‘everybody is Hezbollah’ was used by Rabbani as a way to make the students understand the violent meaning he granted to the export of the Revolution”*.

This same duality was replicated in Guyana, as it has been indicated by the agent Addonizio: *“... in the Islamic centers that he [Abdul Kadir] directed, propaganda about Islam was made and they tried to convert people so that they would join the Shia movement in Guyana. In that search, persons of adequate profile were sought after, that*

is to say, that had the necessary level of commitment to be sent to Iran to complete religious instruction...”.

The indoctrination itself does not only consist in the study of Islam in the students' home countries but also its continuance in the city of Qom, for which the candidates have to be sponsored and also approved a rigorous selection in which it is examined their religious knowledge and mainly, their commitment to the principles of the Islamic Revolution. It is interesting to mention a concrete example whose main characters are precisely, Rabbani and Kadir. In a letter dated March 20th 1999, Kadir answered Rabbani about the “mission” that the last one had entrusted him. He had to assess the aptitudes and commitment of certain members of the local Muslim community.

Therefore, it should be noted that the indoctrination imparted at Qom, Iran, is a key aspect of the export of the Revolution. When characterizing these schools, Iran's Supreme National Security Council Secretary, Saeed Jalili, expressed: “*Qom and the seminars are Iran's arsenal in the area of soft warfare*”. Attention must be paid to the fact that he openly admits that the seminars in Qom are used to cultivate the ideological loyalty of thousands of Shiites and, thus, to continue sustaining the principles of 1979 Revolution. Moreover, Mehdi Khalaji, former student at Qom and Shiite theologian, explained that “*the seminar became the ideological arsenal of the revolutionary regime*”. In addition, it should be considered the publication made by Farzad Razi in 2006, of a list of the terrorist training centers in Iran, which included Beit-Ol-Moqaddas University of Qom.

The active presence of the Iranian intelligence office in the schools of Qom was observed by the then Colombia's National Director of Intelligence, Lieutenant Colonel Luis Gilberto Ramirez Calle, who explained: “*As it has been established, the MOIS usually uses the scholarships [for students] as a way to take potential agents to Iran in order to recruit and train them*”.

So, what starts as a cultural and religious instruction, in certain cases, ends up in the training of extremist fighters, who may be involved in terrorist operations. Assad Hussein Berro, suicide bomber who crushed a truck full of explosives against a convoy of Israelis soldiers in southern Lebanon in August 8th 1989, was religious and ideologically formed in Qom. The Tunisian Fouad Ali Saleh, convicted for the terrorist attacks in Paris in 1985 and 1986, was a student of religion in Qom; and Mohsen Rabbani, who was in charge of the local logistics in the AMIA bombing, is a professor at Qom.

Therefore, it is not odd that the terrorist organization Hezbollah Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah, had been a student at Qom and gave, at least, one speech in the mentioned schools. It should be reminded that this person declared: *“there are a thousand suicide commandos ready to strike Israel all over the world”*.

The close ties between Hezbollah and Iran does no longer need to be clarified. It has been openly admitted by Nasrallah himself when in February, 2012 stated: *“Since 1982, we received moral, political and material support in all possible means from the Islamic Republic of Iran... In the past, we have only talked about the moral and political backing, without mentioning that they had also helped us militarily, to avoid embarrassing Iran. But today, we decided to speak out”*.

Once again, the prosecutor makes a clarification in order to avoid any misunderstanding regarding this indictment. The office is not censuring in any way, and it would not be able to do so, the religious instruction that thousands of well-intended students received in the Qom’s seminars. Objectively, it was remarked the common background that many terrorists shared by having studied Islamic religion in that city, along with the recruitment that the Quds Forces carried out within students, manipulating their religious passion and severely harming the reputation of those schools. Hassan Nasrallah, Mohsen Rabbani, Assad Berro, Fouad Saleh and many other more are a clear example of what it has been stated here.

Intelligence Stations

The dual use of institutions controlled by the Iranian Regime, the cultural, religious and propagation activities conducted by its agents abroad and the radical indoctrination of its supporters, have its ultimate result in the construction of intelligence stations with the capability to provide logistic, economic and operative support to terrorist attacks decided by the Islamic regime, everything under the publicized action of exporting the revolution.

This presentation studies the above mentioned intelligence structures. According to a first analysis of the Prosecution Unit, the intelligence structure settled by the Iranian regime in Buenos Aires was segmented in links, which were characterized by the following main features: the Embassy fulfilled its protocol and consular functions; mosques in charge of the religious activities and the local community received all these joint efforts. A deeper and more detailed scrutiny revealed a different aspect of the structure: illegal activities were covered by the legitimacy of the ones abovementioned. Therefore, embassies performed a shield function, by providing its authorities with a legal coverage and diplomatic immunity. As well, they functioned as ideal channels of information exchange and, also, they monitored eventual reactions of the local government. Mosques were used as bases for recruitment, in search of people with alike radical ideas. Under these lines, Rabbani used the Embassy, the cultural Attaché's Office, the people who attended At Tahuid, Al Imam (Cañuelas) and El Martir (San Miguel de Tucuman) Mosques, the "front companies" such as GTC and Imanco and he radicalized locals who might end up being functional to the Regime's interests.

The innovative contribution of this new indictment lays in the fact that the intelligence station detected in Argentina back in those days was also established in Guyana by the Iranian Regime and, furthermore, those who built these espionage structures –Rabbani and Kadir- were closely related. Consequently, it was concluded that the intellectual author of these structures is the Islamic Republic of Iran, which

created them mainly to gain operative and logistics capabilities to resort to violence, when necessary, in order to remove obstacles that might interfere in the spreading of its objectives.

Here lays the intrinsically dangerous and evil of the situation, derived from the possibility of infiltrating a country and installing an intelligence station under the veil of legitimate activities and without arousing suspicions. As it was stated before, at a certain degree of development, the intelligence station becomes capable to provide the needed local logistics to carry out terrorist actions, once decided, as it happened in Argentina, in many European countries and as it was about to occur again in the United States.

The construction of intelligence stations abroad logically requires a wide and deep knowledge of the distinctive characteristics of the location, as well as of the particular idiosyncrasy of the society where it is going to be established. This is when the locals become important as they know the cultural, political, economic and social aspects of the society. Thus, the Muslim local communities and, within them, those with a radical point of view, are the first recipients of the activities deployed by the Iranian agents.

Also, the Prosecution Unit has referred to the common characteristics of some Iranian people who mingled with the Muslim community in Buenos Aires, stressing that they had arrived to the country since the mid-eighties; they were related to the Iranian government; they studied only medicine; they drove taxis; they frequently attended the Mosques in Cañuelas and/or Floresta, and some of them even were accommodated there; they were connected with Iranian diplomatic officers, working as translators at the Embassy and at its Cultural Attaché's Office; they worked in the "front companies", shared homes and kept a closed relationship with Mohsen Rabbani.

The other special group capable of fulfilling important functions within the intelligence station is the so called "sleeping cells", which were characterized as complementary tools to the embassies, in the Iranian infiltration plan.

According to Mesbahi, its mission *“is very simple, to learn the language and mingled into the society. They know that, when the moment comes, they will be called as agents if necessary...”*.

A clear example of a “sleeping cell”, which was settled for many years in Germany and was used for a terrorist crime, is provided by the French judiciary when referring to the murder of the Iranian dissident Reza Mazlouman: *“Ahmad Jayhooni was 60 years old at the moment of the crime. (...) In 1981, for medical reasons, he emigrated with his family, wife and three children, to Germany, to where he transferred himself the sum of one million marks. Therefore, he was able to acquire a video library in Bonn (...) Jayhooni, owner of a video library in Bonn, was a suspect for recording videos of Iranian dissidents and of transmitting them to the Iranian intelligence service”*.

The “sleeping cells” are potentially very dangerous because they have the capacity to provide, always following superior orders, different kinds of support to terrorist elements that arrive to a country to perpetrate attacks.

This was discovered by European authorities in different cases. The Director of Home Information Service of Berlin, of the former Federal Republic of Germany, mentioned the discovery of an important Iranian group which had been settled at the university to study. The remarkable fact is that these were chronic students and young-adults who already had other studies. It has been determined that their true role was to indoctrinate other Iranians by introducing them radical Shia ideology while controlling them in case they were conspiring against Iran. He added that, in order to be financially self-supported, they drove taxis, although most of them had scholarships and were financed by official Iranian institutions.

Tri-border Area

The tragic event which took place in Buenos Aires in July 18th 1994 and the plan to attack New York’s airport in 2007 -fortunately thwarted-, triggered official

investigations which enabled the gathering of abundant evidence. Those evidentiary pieces allowed detecting that the Iranian Regime established clandestine intelligence structures in, at least, two South American countries, which resources were used to carry out terrorist actions. These same investigations revealed that the infiltration of the Iranian Regime would not have been limited to Argentina and Guyana.

That verification made possible, an even imperative, to review several facts that occurred in other South American countries and were closely connected with those intelligence stations and the abovementioned terrorist activities. For example: the suicidal bomber who died attacking the AMIA Center in Buenos Aires, entered Argentina through the Triborder Area; Samuel Salman El Reda, head of the local operative group, shared his activities between the Triborder Area, Colombia and Argentina; Hadi Soleimanpour, Iranian Ambassador in Argentina at the time of the bombing, was also the highest diplomatic representative of Iran in Paraguay; the coordinator of the AMIA terrorist operation acted from Brazil with a telephone attributed to André Marqués; Mohsen Rabbani also had activities in Uruguay, Chile and Colombia, and so forth.-

Having said so, the indictment states that in the frontier of Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina, known as the Triborder Area, it has been verified the installation of many cultural and religious Islamic institutions (such as “Prophet Mohammed” mosque in Ciudad del Este, the “Husseinia” mosque and the Benefic Islamic Society in Foz de Iguazú), whose leaders were well-known members of Hezbollah in the region, had close ties with Mohsen Rabbani and Samuel Salman El Reda and were strongly related to Iran governmental departments.

This indictment reveals not only the existence of the above mentioned institutions, but also the development of activities, legal and illegal, aimed to obtain funding, documents and accommodation. It also discloses that, under the cover of legal commercial fronts, banned mechanisms were articulated to finance Hezbollah, such as: money laundering, smuggling, tax evasion and document’s forgery.

The strategic alliance between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Hezbollah is very tight in the 'Triborder Area'. Moreover, it exceeded those boundaries reaching other Brazilian cities such as Sao Paulo and Curitiba. A report from the Brazilian Federal Police informs that radicalized Arabic Shias, members of the terrorist organization Hezbollah and Sunnis related to Hamas, the Islamic Yihad and Gamat Al-Islamiyah, were detected particularly in the Brazilian States of Sao Paulo, Parana and the Federal District.

According to Interpol Brasilia, the Islamic Association of Brazil that used to operate in Sao Paulo –and that shared its building with “Prophet Mohammed” mosque- was a common meeting place for Hezbollah’s members.

In the diplomatic arena, the information indicates that Jaffar Saadat Ahmad-Nia, Civil Attaché of the Iranian Embassy in Brasilia between 1991 and 1993, would have worked as an Intelligence agent (VEVAK). About him, Mesbahi also stated that during operative actions this person was “in situ”, from where he directed and solved potential logistic problems. It is striking that he entered Argentina on March 16th, 1992 and left on March 18th, 1992, that is, the previous and the following day of the Israeli Embassy bombing in Buenos Aires.

Regarding this matter, the Brazilian Regional Attorney, in charge of the first region, Alexandre Camanho de Assis said: *“Without being noticed by anyone, a generation of Islamic extremists is emerging in Brazil”*.

In the Republic of Paraguay, actions related to certain aspects of Iranian intelligence bases were verified, such as the financing of terrorist organizations and the presence of Hezbollah’s members, who had legal commercial activities only as a front to conceal illegal ones.

There are hints that the previously mentioned operations are still active. Charif Mahmoud Sayed, religious leader, entered Paraguayan soil on February 2012. He is considered to be a member of Hezbollah’s Foreign Security apparatus and a close

collaborator of Ahmad Vahidi, Minister of Defense of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's administration.

Uruguay, Chile and Colombia

It was corroborated that Mohsen Rabbani's activities in Uruguay, Chile and Colombia were very similar to those he developed in Argentina. This verification makes sense since Rabbani was in charge of leading and coordinating the export of the revolution in Latin America, which allowed him to play a vital role in the establishment and development of Iranian Islamic centers in those countries.

Regarding his performance as regional chief in all Latin America, several witnesses stated: *"(...) regarding Mohsen Rabbani, he says that he was the highest representative of the Shiites in South America (...)"; "(...) he knows that [Mohsen Rabbani] was a cultural representative for Latin America (...)";* while the FBI investigator Robert Addonizio testified that: *"(...) Rabbani was the coordinator of the Shiia movement for South America (...)". This leadership position is confirmed also by the former secretary at the Iranian Embassy in Buenos Aires, who declared that: "Rabbani had even more power than the Ambassador Soleimanpour".-*

For that reason, the Iranian presence in Chile, Uruguay and Colombia was projected by Mohsen Rabbani's figure, in correspondence with his high regional position. Along with his disciples, he organized, developed, maintained Shia Muslim communities in those countries, and indoctrinated them with the radical ideas of the Iranian Islamic revolution.

Given Rabbani's radical ideological profile and the goal he pursued when he came to Argentina, it is feasible to infer that his ideas and the way to spread its extremism in our country was also transmitted to the Islamic communities of neighboring countries, following the common pattern designed by Iran for intelligence infiltration and establishment of bases in Latin America.

His activities were assisted by the Iranian diplomatic representations, whose officers were, in many cases, identified as intelligence agents. One of the Regime Ambassadors in Uruguay was Reza Hajd Zargabashi, who in 1993 was Ambassador in Venezuela and main representative responsible for the Iranian officials that were expelled from that country in July 1994, after trying to kidnap “at gunpoint” an Iranian citizen who was tracked by the regime in order to forcibly send him back to Iran. Another Iranian official that worked at the Embassy in Uruguay was Alí Amini, who participated in the takeover of the US Embassy in Teheran in 1979 as spokesman of the revolutionary group that kept 55 people captive during 444 days.

Also, Mohammad Mehdi Pourmohammadi, accredited as Iranian Ambassador in Uruguay in August 11th, 1987, had criminal records on arms trafficking and was implicated in terrorist activities. The following Ambassador in Uruguay was Mohammad Ali Sarmadi-Rad, was also identified as an Intelligence official. The First Secretary, Ahmad Abousaedi, accredited in Uruguay from April 1st, 1991 to January 23rd, 1995, was identified by witness Mesbahi as a member of the Revolutionary Guards Corps in charge of the local planning in every future attack. Therefore, it is more than suggestive to know for a fact that Abousaedi entered Argentina on June 18th 1994, exactly one month before the AMIA bombing.

Please note that all the above mentioned officials had backgrounds that turn them useful for those parallel activities related to the export of the Revolution. It is evident that the combination of so many people with military and intelligence backgrounds, acting as Iranian foreign officials, cannot be deemed a coincidence. On the contrary, the appointment of these people has been the result of a careful selection aimed to further the final objective.

There was a similar situation regarding the Iranian diplomats accredited in Chile. Hamid Reza Hosseini, Iranian Ambassador in that country, was involved in the takeover of the US Embassy in Teheran in 1979. He was expelled from New York while being part of the Iranian mission before the United Nations, for his participation in intelligence activities. Seyed Yousef Arabi, who was appointed Consular Affairs

Attaché at the Iranian Embassy in Chile from June 9th, 1992 to November 22nd, 1995, was identified as head of the intelligence station and member of VEVAK.

In Colombia, Samuel Salman El Reda, head of the local operative group in the AMIA bombing, benefited from his forged Colombian citizenship to conceal his Lebanese origin and travel with frequency along the continent without raising any suspicion.

Moreover, the words of former Colombian Intelligence Director, Fernando Tabares, should be highlighted in this brief. On December 3rd, 2010 he informed the Colombian Supreme Court of Justice that the national security agencies conducted an investigation which concluded that resources were sent from Maicao -one of the places of residence of Samuel Salman El Reda- to Hezbollah and Al Qaeda. There were structures in Maicao that enabled the inflow of those terrorists, who were provided with Colombian identity documents so that they could travel to other countries in South America. He added that Iran reactivated his Embassy there and that most of the officials that were accrediting themselves were Intelligence Iranian agents, "*MOIS people, very well trained and prepared*". Tabares stated that there were Islamic groups in Colombia that sent people to receive training in Qom, Iran, adding that the Muslim regime trained them in terrorism and then sent them back converted to Islam.

Caribbean, Trinidad and Tobago and Surinam

In the same way that Rabbani projected his influence in several South American countries, Kadir did so in Trinidad and Tobago, Dominica, Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, Surinam and Grenada. His activity as an Iranian leader allowed him to establish and strengthen relations with other regional Islamic leaders and by 1998 he was the representative of the Secretariat of the Caribbean Islamic Movement.

The evolution of the propaganda activities can be observed in the documentation seized during the searches conducted in Kadir's residence and, according to those documents, from 1982 to 1991 took place the initial and expansive

phase for most of the new Shia brothers/sisters in the region. To materialize this cause, Abdul Kadir and his wife Isha traveled every week to Georgetown to teach the new converts. They focused their efforts on recruiting in Linden and Guyana as a whole. They also traveled to Trinidad and even reached Dominica, Barbados, Antigua and Grenada. Their main goal was to introduce the Shia thought locally and throughout the Caribbean.-

Kadir's closest collaborators, such as Latif Ali (also located in Guyana and President of the "Pioneer Shia [Muslim] Association of Guyana") and Ismail Muhammad (based in Surinam, leader of a Shia mosque in Paramaribo, with a post office box under the name "Hezbollah Surinam"), contributed from their locations to the export of the revolution in the Caribbean.

The content of one of Latif Ali's letters to Kadir has turned out to be revealing: *"I got a call from Iran asking me to be available. In other words, they said to me to stay at home. This should not be relayed to the three musketeers...please remember the IRI call is between me and you. I will keep you informed..."*

Special attention should be paid to Sheik Kareem Ibrahiim of Trinidad and Tobago, with close ties with the expansionist Iranian program and sentenced to life imprisonment along with Abdul Kadir for conspiring to blow the John F Kennedy Airport of New York. He was directly connected to the Iranian Regime, which provided him with financial support and also was related to Yasin Abu Bakr, founder and leader of the terrorist Trinidadian group Jamaat al Muslim (JAM). Furthermore and according to Steven Francis's testimony, Ibrahiim received visits from Iranian citizens in Trinidad and his contacts in Iran were going to provide the economic support and the religious authorization –the fatwa- to execute the attack to New York's airport.