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Facebook Fatwa: Saudi Clerics, Wahhabi Islam and Social Media
The Foundation for Defense of Democracies has released the first-ever study of what radical Saudi Wahhabists are preaching to their followers about the United States and non-Muslims on social media sites.
Learn MoreAnalysis & Commentary - Tony Badran
Why Does Obama Refuse to Lead in Iraq?
Last week, General Raymond Odierno, the commander of American forces in Iraq, made statements that refocused attention on the strategic importance of Iraq for US regional interests. Odierno framed the issue, particularly Iraqi parliamentary elections this Sunday, in the context of Washington’s regional confrontation with Iran: Would Iraq succeed and remain a partner of the US, or would it become a satellite of Iran? more...
Barack Obama Can Still Avoid The Syria Trap
The Obama administration last week made a major diplomatic opening to Syria. It dispatched Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns to Damascus for talks, thereby elevating the level of diplomatic contact and further making good on a pledge to engage with countries that George W. Bush’s administration shunned. more...
How Syria Benefits From The Axis of Proliferation
Two weeks ago, a report appeared on the Japanese news site Nikkei quoting Western intelligence sources as saying that North Korea was once again providing "sensitive military technology" to Syria. The report got little coverage in the Western media and came shortly before US the under secretary of state for political affairs, William Burns, is scheduled to visit Syria. The purpose of his trip has been described as being about Iran as well as Syria's ongoing smuggling of weapons to Hezbollah. more...
Hezbollah Is Not The IRA
Islamist groups have invited a whole set of analogies purportedly aimed at better explaining them and how best to deal with them. One such analogy that has gained currency in recent years is the oft-encountered comparison between Islamist groups and the Irish Republican Army. more...
Lebanon’s Next War May Also Be Syria’s
Media reports in recent days have painted dire scenarios for what is, supposedly, the inevitable conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. Of particular note are persistent indicators that the next round, if or when it comes, will very likely involve Syria as well... more...
Hezbollah’s “Lebanonization”
Manuela Paraipan: Why is the Lebanonization of Hezbollah a chimera?
Tony Badran: This is a rather timely question with the recent unveiling of Hezbollah's so-called new political manifesto.
The conventional wisdom and the dominant interpretation of this document, in the media, is that it signals the "Lebanonization" of the Islamist group and its "evolution" away from Islamist rhetoric and other maximalist positions. In many ways, this is merely a recycling of the old argument put forth by Augustus Richard Norton and others starting in the late 1990s. Both the old theory and its current reincarnation miss the mark, and in fact have been thoroughly discredited and disproved by events.
Manuela Paraipan: How so?
Tony Badran: The Lebanonization theory is an amalgam of various misreadings of Hezbollah.
It was stipulated in the late '90s that Hezbollah was merely concerned with purely Lebanese goals, namely the liberation of southern Lebanon, and that once Israel withdrew, Hezbollah would close shop. Indeed, Norton wrote in 1998 that Hezbollah was "preparing for life after resistance."
Very clearly, this has been shown to be wrong.
Hezbollah today has dissociated its armed status from an Israeli withdrawal from the disputed Shebaa Farms, and has linked it to Israel's very existence: so long as Israel exists, Hezbollah's reasoning goes, it will constitute a threat to Lebanon, a threat that can only be countered by its continued armed status. At the same time, Hezbollah's manifesto includes the "liberation" of Jerusalem, which the organization describes as a "religious duty." This duty carries great peril for Lebanon.
In order to support this argument of a purely Lebanese outlook for Hezbollah, its proponents went to great lengths to dissociate the group from any acts of global terrorism. One argument was that since the group had Shiite support and maintained "social networks," that somehow meant that it can no longer be dubbed a terrorist group.
Furthermore, as I showed almost two years ago, there was a systematic denial on the part of the majority of Hezbollah analysts of any ties between the group and terror mastermind, Imad Mughniyeh.
After Mughniyeh's assassination this façade fell apart as the Party openly hailed him as an exalted member of its triumvirate of "martyred" leaders (along with Abbas Musawi and Ragheb Harb). Furthermore, reports of Hezbollah's involvement in Iraq, the arrest of its cells in Egypt, Azerbaijan, and the foiling of one of its plots in Turkey, not to mention its networks in South America, have all demolished any argument denying Hezbollah's global reach.
Similarly, the Party's openly declared subservience to the Ruling Jurisconsult (al-wali al-faqih) -- the Supreme Guide of Iran, Ali Khamenei, as well as they Party's organic ties to the Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), make a mockery of any claim of "Lebanonization."
In brief, the "Lebanonization" theorists get it exactly backwards. As the Shiite organization's deputy secretary general himself says, Hezbollah seeks to "integrate the rest of society" into its vision and project, not the other way around.
Manuela Paraipan: Could the status quo ever change?
Tony Badran: The precedents aren't encouraging. When Lebanon had a comparable situation with the PLO's parallel state on its soil, that unsustainable situation ended in all-out war. The events of May 2008, in particular, placed Lebanon on a similar path. There is a fundamental difference, of course, in that the rank and file of Hezbollah is comprised of Lebanese citizens, and the organization enjoys strong support in the Shiite community. However, Hezbollah is an essential part of Iran's objective to be the region's primary power. The Shiite organization is part of an ongoing battle for the region, as they themselves say. Their weapons are therefore directly tied to the fate of the Iranian regime and its strategic goals.
Either way, the prospects for Lebanon aren't great.
In the case of an Israeli or American attack on Iran, Hezbollah is likely to be part of the subsequent retaliation, which means that Lebanon will pay a heavy price. In the case Iran goes nuclear, then Hezbollah's arms will have a nuclear umbrella, which renders Lebanon's situation even bleaker.
Tony Badran is a research fellow with the Center for Terrorism Research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He has the blog Across the Bay.
For Hezbollah, Lebanon is an Afterthought
Two things were unsurprising about Hezbollah’s political document, unveiled on November 30 by the party’s secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, namely its content and characterization in the media. more...
The Pretense of Reform
Senior officials in the Obama administration are batting around the notion that the Taliban in Afghanistan could play a role comparable to that of Hezbollah in Lebanon, according to The Washington Post. more...
Inglorious Baathists
A crisis has erupted between Iraq and Syria after the bombings in Baghdad last week that claimed hundreds of victims, dead and injured. The Iraqi government has blamed Syria for the attacks, declaring that Syria must choose between normal relations with Iraq or remaining a terrorist haven. These officials have also suggested that the Syrians are trying to forcefully carve a political role out for themselves in Iraq.
The bombings immediately followed a visit to Syria by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and occurred a week after a trip to Damascus by a delegation from US Central Command. The Iraqi government named two Baathist figures harbored by Syria as having a direct role in the attacks. Of the two, Muhammad Younis Ahmad bears closer attention.
A former Iraqi Baathist official, Ahmad tried forming a new leadership of the Iraqi Baath party at a conference in 2007, which he sought to hold under Syrian auspices. This led to his expulsion from the Baath led by Saddam Hussein's former deputy, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, who accused Ahmad of working with Syrian intelligence. The conference never saw the light, a testament to the political irrelevance of the figures involved.
At that time, and much like Maliki did earlier this month, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani led a delegation to Syria in order to discuss border security and the handing over of wanted figures--among them, it was rumored, Ahmad himself. And like today, the Syrians refused to accede to this.
Ahead of the recent Central Command visit, news reports indicated that the US military, too, had presented Syria with the names of individuals they wanted captured. The Syrians, with their usual evasiveness, apparently told certain foreign diplomats that they had expelled Ahmad earlier this year. Clearly, that claim was untrue as the Iraqis now say that they repeatedly requested Ahmad's handover, to no avail.
More curious was what Iraqi official sources told the Al-Sabah daily several days after the Baghdad attacks. They said that Iraq had "recently rejected a Syrian wish to have a role in painting the Iraqi political landscape ... by creating a foothold for itself through figures close to [Damascus]." The sources noted that Syria was trying to "impose certain Baathist figures and open the way for them to participate in political life and the upcoming parliamentary elections."
We can speculate that one such Baathist client would be Ahmad, whom the Syrians have been cultivating for over two years.
A quick perusal of the talking points the Syrians have distributed to their advocates in the media further supports this conclusion. The Syrians essentially explained to Maliki that there would be no security in Iraq without true "reconciliation"--meaning, without the inclusion of their Baathist clients such as Ahmad. That is why they told the Iraqi prime minister that they would not hand anyone over. Sami Moubayed, a Syrian commentator who often channels regime thinking, even wrote that Maliki now "realizes the folly of such a request", since Syrian-harbored figures can "help bring about reconciliation" in Iraq. Thus, they were "a blessing in disguise" that Maliki "will use to bolster his own government."
The Syrians tried to shape Maliki's agenda ahead of his visit to Damascus. They leaked to the media that the purpose of the talks was not an Iraqi appeal that Syria hand over wanted figures, but rather that Maliki sought Syrian "help" in forming a "nationalist" electoral coalition, and perhaps even to use Syria as a counterweight to the Iraqi Awakening Councils.
The Syrians may have calculated that Maliki was politically vulnerable and had "lost the US umbrella." Thus, they were wagering that he would see "the light in Damascus," as Moubayed put it. The commentator evensuggested that the Syrian bid enjoyed American cover, with the United States having "invited" the Syrians to "play a greater role in Iraqi affairs"!
Seen in this context, the Baghdad bombings were a familiar calling card from Syria: violent extortion to extract political gains. The use of Ahmad has also been a vintage tactic of the Syrians--which they have played effectively in such places as Lebanon and on the Palestinian front--namely sponsorship of splinter factions and the cultivation of clients who have no constituency, therefore who are reliant on Syria. This is endemic to Syrian behavior, and why we shouldn't expect any change. Syria's destabilization of its neighbors and interference in their affairs are the only tools permitting Damascus to project influence beyond its real political weight.
Maliki has, since, publicly rebuffed the Syrians. Iraq is not Lebanon. Such brazen Syrian acts will also have negative repercussions on the already cautious US engagement of Damascus. As one diplomat observed ahead of the Central Command visit, "the [US] effort to convince Syria to change its behavior is not open ended." With Syria's regional policies becoming increasingly destructive, we can only hope the diplomat is right.
Tony Badran is a research fellow with the Center for Terrorism Research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. more...
Syria Celebrates Too Soon on Sanctions
The Obama administration has announced it is easing the processing of certain export licenses to Syria, within the framework of sanctions in effect since the previous administration. Syrian spokesmen were quick to hail this as the crack that would open the floodgates and terminate the sanctions regime altogether... more...
Hezbollah Is Being Elusive on Wilayat al-Faqih
There is a glaring contradiction between Hezbollah's recent statements about the concept of Wilayat al-Faqih (the rule of the jurisprudent) and events in Iran. The reverberations of the events, regardless of their outcome, are being felt hundreds of miles away in Lebanon, specifically by Hezbollah. Far more than protesting a fraudulent electoral process, the Iranians who have chanted "death to Khamenei" have also taken a sledgehammer to the basic tenets of Hezbollah's dogmatic universe.
Days ago, Hezbollah Member of Parliament and Minister Muhammad Fneish, lashed out at the party's domestic critics, complaining that "attacking" Wilayat al-Faqih was an offense against Lebanon's Shia, one that constituted "a violation of the freedom of belief."
Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah picked up where Fneish left off, saying, "the subject of the Wilayat al-Faqih and the Imamate is at the heart of our religious doctrine, and any offense to it is an offense to our religion." Recognizing that his statement was a transparent bending of the truth, Nasrallah tried to outflank his adversaries by inserting a caveat: "[T]he lack of unanimous agreement among Shia on Wilayat al-Faqih does not prevent it from being part of our doctrine." He ended by trying to have it both ways: "And so, in all politeness I tell you, say what you will in politics and stay away from offending our beliefs."
In other words, Nasrallah paid lip service to the reality that the Wilayat al-Faqih concept remains an idiosyncrasy that many senior Shiite religious scholars have rejected. He has done this in order to claim its hold over all of Lebanese Shia, whom Hezbollah has used as a shield against condemnation of its agenda, behavior and weapons. Hezbollah is seeking to create a link between Lebanese Shia and Wilayat al-Faqih, making them subjects of Iran's Supreme Leader, whether they like it or not.
However, as Saoud al-Mawla, an advisor to the late Shiite cleric, Sheikh Muhammad Mehdi Shamseddine, remarked in an interview with L'Orient-Le Jour this week, Wilayat al-Faqih, far from being a theological doctrine as Nasrallah contended, is a concept of jurisprudence, meaning that nothing prevents it from being challenged.
But Nasrallah's trick is one that has served Hezbollah well. The party has always manipulated its hybrid nature to its advantage: it is an armed movement and a provider of social assistance; it is a military party but also a political one; and when disapproval intensifies, it defends itself by affirming its religious nature. Similarly, we are now told the Wilayat al-Faqih is a religious not a political question. Hezbollah media representative Ibrahim al-Moussawi practiced this line on a foreign journalist last month: "These are purely religious questions," he told him. "The Wilayat al-Faqih is a concept that is central to Islam, but it was crystallized in the thought of the Ayatollah Khomeini... So you see that this is a purely religious question that has nothing to do with Iran."
Aside from the fact that senior Lebanese Shia clerics--including the late Shamseddine and Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah--have rejected the concept as formulated by Khomeini, it is absurd to claim that it is a "purely religious" matter that has nothing to do with Iran. The mere fact that the wali al-faqih, the Jurisprudent, is today Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, makes it very much about Iran. All the more significant, Khomeini's thesis relates specifically to Islamic governance, which means it is very much political.
The Wilayat al-Faqih claims worldly, political and social authority over all Shia. As scholar Hassan Mneimneh recently put it in an article on the Arab reception of the concept: "Wilayat al-Faqih entails the recognition of the absolute worldly authority of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Supreme Leader (Rahbar), in whom the ultimate executive, legislative, and judiciary powers [are] supposed to reside." Mneimneh added: "In the early 21st Century Arab world, support for the imported Khomeinist doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih... within Shia communities is invariably synonymous with political allegiance to the Islamic Republic of Iran."
Hezbollah's own experience lends support to Mneimneh's remarks. Not only did Hezbollah seek Khamenei's permission to enter parliamentary politics in 1992, but the party's deputy secretary general, Naim Qassem, has written in his book on Hezbollah that "the wali al-faqih alone possesses the authority to decide war and peace." If this is the prerogative of the Supreme Leader-the head of a foreign state--then how can Hezbollah ever accept that the Lebanese government alone should decide on matters of war and peace? This only underlines that Hezbollah and a sovereign Lebanese state can never be compatible.
What did Nasrallah say when Iranians took to the streets shouting "death to Khamenei?" What an offense it must have been to his religious beliefs. Are we honestly being asked to accept that the Lebanese cease all criticism of the concept of governance underwriting Khamenei's authority, when his legitimacy at home is being directly challenged in far starker terms?
Tony Badran is a research fellow with the Center for Terrorism Research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
Why Western Media Got Lebanon’s Elections So Wrong
The biggest failure in Lebanon’s election was not just General Michel Aoun. more...
A Looming Crisis In Lebanon?
On Sunday, June 7, the Lebanese held parliamentary elections and handed the incumbent coalition a decisive victory over the opposition, which is led by the Iranian-sponsored militant group Hezbollah. more...
Syria’s plan
In an interview with the Emirate daily Al-Khaleej last week, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad once again revealed his intention to dominate Lebanon. more...
Bashar Assad the Peacemaker? Think Again
In the last two or three years, a number of old arguments regarding Syria have again become fashionable. more...
The Syria-Iran Alliance
In recent years, a number of erroneous notions have been re-injected into the policy discourse on the thirty-year old alliance between Syria and Iran. more...
Which Way Will the Wind Blow From Damascus?
Syrian President Bashar Assad has become the hottest ticket in the world, from Washington to Paris and from Riyadh to Cairo. Everybody wants to meet him, be seen with him and get on his good side. That is an amazing turnaround from three years ago where he was shunned and viewed as a pariah. Syria has suddenly become the key to solving the insoluble problems of the Middle East. And in a way it is true, but the question remains: what does Assad really intend to do and ask for?
The Syrian president has been testing the waters for a few months now regarding a rapprochement with the West. It started with France and French President Nicolas Sarkozy's active overture to Damascus, due in part to the constant advice and friendly pressure from Qatar. This French diplomatic move was not well viewed at the time by the George W. Bush administration because since 2004, France and the United States had worked hand in hand in isolating Assad. Assad knew quite well that the new incoming Barack Obama administration would be very much inclined to reach out. Which it did very recently by sending two emissaries to visit Assad in Damascus.
The thinking is that Syria is the weakest link to getting at Iran and if a wedge could be driven between the two countries, then it would be much easier to pressure Tehran and decrease the mullah's leverage on the international community.
In fact, by getting Syria to switch camps, Hezbollah and Hamas, Tehran's two most powerful proxies would be dramatically weakened.
But easier said than done, Damascus is not ready to give up its alliance with Tehran. Most probably Assad knows he has the upper hand in negotiations. He will likely have extensive demands, such as the end of U.S. sanctions, the withdrawal of Syria from the U.S. State Department list of countries supporting terrorism, the Israeli evacuation of the Golan and financial aid to make up for the loss of Tehran's help.
All these listed potential demands are in the realm of the possible, but what Assad really wants more than anything is to get the international tribunal investigating the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri off his back. Indeed, the investigation from the start has pointed out the responsibility of Damascus in the attack, potentially involving very high-ranking members of Assad's entourage and most prominently Syria's powerful former head of the Security services and Assad's own brother-in-law, Asaf Shawkate.
After a five-year investigation, the special tribunal located in The Hague finally saw the day on March 1, though it is unlikely that proceedings will start overnight. Some believe that the court is unlikely to start proceedings before two to three years.
Nonetheless, troubling news coming from the Netherlands is boding ill for things to come. According to the Swiss daily Le Temps, citing a Dutch security source, some individuals that were taking pictures of a village near The Hague where the tribunal is located, belong to the Hezbollah, the pro-Iranian and pro-Syrian Shiite militia. Also three "incidents" (no more precisions were given) have been recorded by Dutch authorities.
Assad is definitely feeling the heat of the tribunal. During a recent interview by the Emirati daily Al-Khaleej, when asked about the tribunal, Assad reportedly warned that if the tribunal is politicized then "Lebanon will be the first to pay the price." A warning that must have sent shivers down the spines of most Lebanese politicians from the March 14 majority.
History has shown - though it remains to be proven in a court of law - that Syria has the capacity of upsetting the apple cart in Lebanon. Several Lebanese politicians, as well as U.S. officials have accused Syria of being behind a spate of political assassinations in Lebanon.
Assad also hinted that regardless the outcome of next June's parliamentary elections in Lebanon, he nevertheless expected a status quo, meaning that Hezbollah would retain its right to veto on any government decision.
One of the dangers facing Lebanon is if Assad includes it as part of his negotiation package. John Kerry said after his visits to Damascus and Beirut a few weeks ago that the United States would stand by Lebanon. Hopefully that is a statement the Lebanese can take to the bank. But just how solvent are the banks these days remains to be seen.
more...Don’t Let Damascus Out of the Doghouse
For years, the regime in Damascus has been an international pariah, given Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's support for terrorist groups Hamas and Hezbollah, his family's heavy-handed attempts to dominate Lebanon, his broken promises on domestic reform, and his proxy war against U.S. troops in Iraq. more...
How Iranian Shells Reach the Mideast’s Seashores
The recent assassination of Hamas official Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in Dubai has been described as another episode in an ongoing shadow war between Israel and Islamist groups, particularly Hamas and Hezbollah. However, the Mabhouh incident also shed light on another shadowy enterprise underpinning the destabilization of the Middle East and Iran’s quest for regional hegemony, namely Tehran’s smuggling of arms. more...
It is Clutch Time for Syria
Time is running out for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. He will have to decide in the next few weeks whether his overture to the West is genuine or not. To Assad's credit a slew of events are pointing to his good faith, but he is still afraid to totally break loose from Iran's grip. Whatever decision the Syrian president makes will have a great impact on the region.
Assad has been opening to both the European Union and Israel. But Syria's main prize would be to get a clear relationship with Washington established. And it seems that after a long silence, Washington is more inclined to talk.
In fact, last week the Kuwaiti daily Al-Jarida reported that U.S. President George W. Bush apparently offered his Syrian counterpart to pressure Israel to withdraw from the Golan Heights if Damascus promises to cut its ties with Tehran. Bush allegedly made this proposal in a letter recently presented to Assad by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas during his visit to Damascus.
If Assad accepts the American deal, he will have to implement the agreement in the coming weeks. Time is of the essence since the Bush administration would like to ink such a deal before leaving office in January.
But what is really at the center of it all is the risk of the international tribunal to go ahead and try the culprits of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. In fact, the final report of Canadian judge and future prosecutor of the tribunal, Daniel Bellemare, should be published in Lebanon in December.
According to details leaked to the media, the report is damning for Syria, establishing the role of Assad's regime, its allies and agents in Lebanon in the murder of Hariri and describes in detail the various stages of the preparation of the attack.
Assad cannot sleep at night thinking that his regime's role could be exposed in the open in a United Nations sponsored arena. Syria would become overnight a pariah in the international community and this would put an indelible stain on Assad's legacy.
It is true that Assad has tried to put distance between those reportedly responsible for Hariri's murder and himself. First, his brother-in-law, former head of the security services Assef Shawkat; second, a slew of timely murders have made the list of potential witnesses shrink.
The real change in Assad's strategy has been his distancing from Hezbollah. This is all the more interesting as contrary to his father, Bashar Assad had a vassal relationship with Hezbollah's leader Hassan Nasrallah.
In typical Assad fashion, Syria is following a two-track strategy: distancing from Hezbollah and at the same time doing business as usual. That is why while no one can talk of a severed relationship with the Lebanese Shiite group (Hezbollah is still being supplied with weapons by Damascus), some events show that the honeymoon is over and the marriage is on a slippery slope.
Everything started when Hezbollah's most prized asset, legendary terror master Imad Mughnieh was killed in Damascus in February. The culprits could not be found and the results of the so-called investigation were clearly pushed under the rug.
But what is clear is that there is no way the killers could not have had a very close connection to the higher echelons of the Syrian security services. There is no way Mughnieh could have been killed without complicity from the inside.
So whether the Israelis were behind it or the Syrian regime itself makes no real difference. What is important is that Hezbollah operatives are not safe in Damascus anymore.
Second, recent reports show that Syria is trying to break up Hezbollah. In fact, Syria has reportedly resumed its contacts with the former secretary-general of Hezbollah and one of its co-founders, Sobhi Toufaili. Syria wants to strengthen Toufaili's faction and has promised it military aid and funding to weaken Hassan Nasrallah's wing.
Third, to show his good faith, Assad has allegedly informed Israel - through the Europeans - of planned Hezbollah abductions of Israeli citizens in several countries in Africa and in the Americas.
Fourth, last week the Iraqi Web site Al-Malaf ran a puzzling story. Interestingly, the always well informed Kuwaiti daily Al-Seyassah ran a similar story the next day.
According to diplomatic sources in Beirut cited by Al-Malaf, Nasrallah was poisoned by highly hazardous chemicals and has been in a very critical state in the past few days.
He was saved just in time by an Iranian medical team composed of 15 doctors, who flew to Beirut in an Iranian aircraft. Nasrallah was to have been transferred to Tehran, but the doctors managed to save him.
The likely culprits include Israel that has threatened to assassinate Nasrallah, but it could not have succeeded without complicity inside Hezbollah.
On Friday, Nasrallah went on Hezbollah's TV station, Al-Manar, to deny this story. So while the veracity of this story is very much in the air, what is sure is that there seems to be great tension and dissension inside Hezbollah between the Syrian wing and the Iranian one.
Assad seems to be sending signals to the West and even taking concrete steps, but at the same time he does not want to cut off the hand that feeds him: Tehran's. If Washington is ready to replace Tehran, then Assad would likely have no problems sacrificing Hezbollah.
This is the moment the United States has been waiting for: an opportunity to weaken Iran and get Syria on the West's side. But with the country focused on the Nov. 4 elections, will there be anyone around to move the system in the right direction?
more...