March 29, 2013 | Policy Brief

African AQ Affiliate Groups Leave Signatures in Mali

March 29, 2013 | Policy Brief

African AQ Affiliate Groups Leave Signatures in Mali

Al-Qaeda affiliated groups in northern Mali launched a two-pronged attack in Gao last weekend. There were no reported fatalities; Malian soldiers were able to repel both attacks. However, the incident shows that al-Qaeda affiliate groups are still able to launch coordinated attacks, and they continue to threaten the stability of northern Mali.

The two-tiered attack is a signature of al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Since the late 1990s, they have launched several multi-pronged attacks designed to inflict maximum damage in Africa. In 1998, al-Qaeda carried out near-simultaneous bombings at the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. In November 2002, al-Qaeda struck again in Kenya, detonating a suicide car bomb at Mombasa’s Paradise Hotel, killing ten Kenyans and three Israelis; at roughly the same time, al-Qaeda operatives fired two surface-to-air missiles that narrowly missed an Israeli-chartered flight bound for Tel Aviv shortly after takeoff.  In April 2007, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) targeted the Prime Minister’s offices in Algiers, setting off a second bomb on the outskirts of the city.

The recent violence in Mali bears another signature of al-Qaeda’s affiliates.  When faced with a stronger military, such as when the U.S. and its allies overran the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002, they embrace guerrilla warfare. Thus, while the joint French and Malian forces challenged Islamist rule in Gao and other cities dotting Mali’s north, the Movement for Oneness in West Africa (MUJWA), Ansar Dine, and AQIM gave up trying to hold on the territory they controlled, and embarked on a new campaign of irregular war.

Notably, Gao experienced northern Mali’s first suicide bombing on February 8. Two days later, a second suicide attack rocked a military checkpoint at the city’s entrance. On March 21, a suicide bomber attacked a military checkpoint near Timbuktu’s airport.

Such tactics have only estranged the Islamist forces from the Malian population. Their strict interpretation of Islam and violent tactics won them few supporters when they took control of northern Mali last year. Nearly 450,000 northern Malians fled the violence. Those who stayed grew furious with the Islamist groups because they were unable to provide basic services, including electricity and water.

While the battle for hearts and minds may be waning, the battle for territorial control continues. The French have indicated their intent to stay in Mali through the end of the year, but they lack a clear plan to protect the population of northern Mali or to deter the Islamists from returning. Northern Malians need to be given the security and space to rebuild.  More importantly, the government needs additional training and support to do so independently.  

Laura Grossman is senior research analyst and program manager for special research projects at Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Issues:

Afghanistan Al Qaeda