April 21, 2014 | Policy Brief

The Growing IRGC Challenge to Rouhani

April 21, 2014 | Policy Brief

The Growing IRGC Challenge to Rouhani

Since his election last June, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has been laboring to edge the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) out of the economy. Not taking this very kindly, the IRGC has engaged in an increasingly vitriolic campaign against Rouhani’s economic policies and nuclear negotiations with the P5+1.

The latest battle between Rouhani and the IRGC  took place on February 25, when Hamid-Reza Araghi, deputy minister of oil and National Iranian Gas Company managing director, announced the cancelation of a $1.3 billion contract with the IRGC-owned construction firm Khatam al-Anbia, due to “delays” and an inability to attract external financing. On March 2, Ebad-Allah Abdollahi, the head of Khatam al-Anbia, dismissed the announcement, insisting that the project was still “active.”

The IRGC has since made several public proclamations about its centrality to the Iranian economy, particularly as a bulwark against continued sanctions if the current nuclear talks fail. In late March, IRGC commander Mohammad-Ali Aziz Jafari declared, “The great capacities of the Guards and the Basij can help the government in the resistance economy.” A few weeks later, on April 13, IRGC Brigadier General Masoud Jazaeri warned that the Islamic Republic Armed Forces would not recognize “any agreement [with the P5+1] which is contrary to the fundamentals.”  Jafari followed up the following day, complaining that the Rouhani government was ignoring the economic capabilities of the Guards, asserting that the “nuclear negotiations increase the duties of the Guards.”

Reading between the lines, the message was clear: If the IRGC does not benefit economically, it will not recognize any agreement between the Rouhani government and the P5+1.

Rouhani appears less than eager to engage the Guards. Instead, in his April 18 Army Day speech, he showered praise on Iran’s regular military for its non-intervention in politics, and “never demanding its share [of money] from the nation.” The speech provoked angry commentary from IRGC Ground Forces chief Mohammad Pakpour and Jafari, who rather bluntly reminded the Supreme Leader in a public address that the “sedition of 2009” (Green Revolution) would not have ended without IRGC and Basij intervention.

The ongoing spat between Rouhani and the Guards serves as a warning to the West that, even if a deal is struck, the IRGC may stand in the way of its implementation. More broadly, it is a reminder that should Khamenei face a domestic challenge, he would have no choice but to turn to the IRGC to secure the regime’s survival. This could shift power back into the hands of the Guards and reverse whatever concessions the West has extracted from the Rouhani government, putting Washington back at square one.

Ali Alfoneh is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Issues:

Iran