August 3, 2015 | Policy Brief

Iran’s Majles and the JCPOA

August 3, 2015 | Policy Brief

Iran’s Majles and the JCPOA

In the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed last month, Iran’s concessions on its nuclear activities have sunset clauses that begin expiring in year 10. Beyond year 15, Tehran will be permitted to expand its industrial-sized program without limits and with no obligations to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to most of its nuclear facilities.   

Only one document remains critical to ensure the Islamic Republic does not maximize this ambiguity to the fullest: the Additional Protocol (AP). The AP grants the IAEA expanded rights of access to information and sites, and is key to verifying the absence of undeclared activities and facilities. Under the JCPOA, however, Iran is required to notify the IAEA of its provisional application of the AP and then only to “proceed with” and “seek” – rather than actually obtain – ratification of the AP in its parliament, or Majles, by the end of year eight. This step not only happens late in the process, it also appears to be aspirational and non-binding.

The role of the Majles in approving the JCPOA may also be aspirational. Two years after Tehran first signed and provisionally implemented the AP in 2003, parliamentarians voted to cease Iran’s obligations under it, citing their objection to the transfer of Iran’s nuclear file from the IAEA to the U.N. Security Council and the alleged violation of their constitutional prerogative to ratify treaties. After the recent deal’s announcement, several hardline legislators again insisted the same.

But as it stands now, the review and approval of the JCPOA appears to be the responsibility of the Supreme National Security Council — an influential body charged with formulating Iran’s national security policy, which answers directly to the supreme leader and whose members include the heads of the executive, intelligence, and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Thus, parliamentary review of the deal will amount to a rubber stamp of that council’s decision.

The nominal role of the Majles in the enforcement and ratification of the JCPOA should serve as a warning. The supreme leader continues to call the shots in Iran, despite hopes that reform or even moderation could result from the deal. On the nuclear file, as on so many others in the Islamic Republic, it is the supreme leader who wields supreme authority.

Amir Toumaj is a Iran Research Analyst at Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Follow FDD_Iran on Twitter.

Issues:

Iran Iran Sanctions