AQAP’s Shifting Tactics in Yemen

Yesterday, al Qaeda militants staged a coordinated attack on a Yemeni military headquarters in the southern port city of Aden, detonating a bomb laden vehicle at the complex’s main gate and attempting to storm the facility. This brazen assault was the latest in a string of sophisticated attacks carried out by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) targeting major government and military facilities in Yemen.

Since mid-2012, AQAP has stepped up the use of coordinated assaults on significant government and military facilities. Some examples include the September 2013 suicide assault against three military bases in Shabwa and the complex suicide assault against the Security Department headquarters in Aden. AQAP is not “imitating” ISIS as some have argued; the group has launched sophisticated assaults on military targets in the past. Rather, AQAP is changing the nature of its operations in response to its changing fortunes in Yemen. 

Between 2011 and 2012, AQAP controlled large areas of the southern provinces of Abyan and Shabwa and even declared an Islamic emirate in these areas in 2011. Carrying out complex suicide assaults was counterproductive to its goal of holding territory and currying favor with the local population. After AQAP lost its territory in mid-2012, however, the group reverted to a campaign of coordinated suicide assaults mainly carried out in the south, in an effort to maintain the pressure on Yemen’s security forces.

Despite an intensification of the US drone campaign since 2012, there are no signs that AQAP’s ranks have been significantly depleted or that its operational capabilities have been diminished. Although the strikes have killed some senior military and spiritual leaders including deputy emir Said al-Shihri, AQAP has been able to successfully regenerate its leadership, effectively limiting the long-term effect of US operations. Al Qaeda Senior Leadership is confident enough in AQAP’s abilities that it appointed Nasir al Wuhayshi, AQAP’s emir, to also serve as al Qaeda’s general manager.

The reality is the US drone strikes and Yemeni military operations are not depleting AQAP’s leadership fast enough to cause a collapse. Additionally, although Yemeni troops recaptured territory from AQAP in 2012, they have not been able to clear its network from areas that still represent a haven for the terrorist network. AQAP has also shifted to areas where Yemeni security forces are weak, such as Hadramout province in the southeast. 

AQAP not only threatens Yemen’s security, it also remains a significant threat to the United States. AQAP has been clear in its propaganda that it seeks to conduct attacks on US soil as well as against US interests abroad. Its ability to maintain its local insurgency in Yemen ensures that it has a large cadre of recruits to carry out such attacks.

Bill Roggio is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and editor of The Long War Journal. Oren Adaki is a research associate at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.