Russia and the Illusion of “Snapback” Iran Sanctions

President Obama insists that international sanctions, soon to be removed, can be “snapped back” should Iran violate the terms of a potentially impending nuclear deal. Re-implementing sanctions, however, is easier said than done. It requires overcoming massive diplomatic, economic, and psychological hurdles. A case in point is Russia, which stands to benefit from the post-sanctions environment, and is already signaling its lack of enthusiasm for renewing the sanctions regime.

So far this year, Moscow and Tehran have signed a military cooperation agreement, and the Kremlin has lifted a ban on the export of advanced S-300 anti-aircraft missiles. The two sides also signed a banking cooperation agreement in March, and this month Tehran announced plans for a joint rial account for Russian banks, enabling Iranian exporters to Russia to receive payment in their own currency.

Having thus cleared its path to gain from a nuclear deal, the Kremlin leadership is making clear that there will be no going back.

After last month’s nuclear talks in Lausanne, Switzerland, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said UN sanctions “no longer work” and should no longer hinder Iran’s international trade. Lavrov said Russia opposes the very principle of unilateral snapback sanctions, whether the target is Iran “or any other country.”

Lest the message remained unclear, Moscow’s Ambassador to the United Nations Vitaly Churkin clarified last week that in terms of sanctions reversal, “There can be no automaticity – none whatsoever.”

Years of painstaking diplomacy, led by the United States, produced the economic leverage that ultimately brought Iran to the nuclear table. As Russia continues to remind us, if relinquished, that leverage will be exceedingly difficult to restore.

Boris Zilberman is deputy director of congressional relations at Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where he is also a Russia analyst. Find him on Twitter: @rolltidebmz