August 24, 2016 | Forbes

Boeing Should Think Twice Before Iran Sale

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached last year between Iran and six world powers lifted sanctions against Iran’s aviation sector, allowing aircraft manufacturers like Boeing and Airbus to sell aircraft to Iran. But the fact that those prohibitions have been lifted does not mean that the rationale behind them has changed.

Iran remains the foremost state sponsor of terrorism in the world and is still number one on the recently-released Basel Anti-Money Laundering Index Report of 2016, which assesses the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing in 149 countries. Iranian commercial aircraft routinely violate international aviation rules by transporting arms and military personnel to Syria, and selling aircraft to Iran will expose manufacturers to the risk of becoming complicit in such activities.

Tehran wants to buy up to 500 aircraft over the next decade to rejuvenate its aging fleet, and Airbus seeks to sell 118 of its own. Tehran has also struck a deal with the French-Italian ATR to buy 40 regional planes, and other deals are in the works with Canada’s Bombardier and Brazil’s Embraer. DespiteCongressional opposition to the Boeing sale, the Iran Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) expects this deal to go through. Given the Obama administration’s support for the deal, this optimism is understandable, but premature. Once manufacturers take a hardnosed look at its terms, they will realize the risks far outweigh the benefits.

The problem with the Islamic Republic’s aircraft shopping spree is that Iran’s state-owned airline, Iran Air, will be the sole company purchasing these aircraft. Its current fleet stands at 36 aircraft; its subsidiary, Iran Air Tours, has 14. Because it does not need so many planes, it is not likely to retain all of the aircraft it purchases. Iran Air will more likely act as a front for all other Iranian airlines, including, crucially, Mahan Air, which remains under U.S. sanctions for its ongoing support for Iran’s military involvement in Syria.

Mahan Air is the primary airline running illicit flights to Damascus, using the Iranian airport of Abadan as the logistical hub. Tehran’s military airlift to Syria began in 2011, shortly after its popular protests degenerated into a full-fledged civil war, and has increased in tempo since August 2015 from weekly to daily flights. These flights provide fresh supplies and recruits to at least three groups of U.S. adversaries: the Syrian Armed Forces, Hezbollah and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. All are supporting Assad’s brutal regime in a war that has claimed half a million lives since 2011. New aircraft bought by Iran would sooner or later end up helping this ongoing airlift.

Even if Iran Air refrained from transferring aircraft to Mahan, there is no guarantee the former will refrain from participating in the Syria airlift. After all, the U.S. Treasury had sanctioned Iran Air in 2011, including for its role in Iran’s weapons airlift to Syria. Iran Air was delisted under the JCPOA in January, making it legal to sell planes to the airline. But Iran Air may still be involved in illicit activities, making it likely that it could be re-sanctioned in the future.

Its planes have recently flown known weapons resupply routes to Syria. On June 9, an Iran Air aircraft flew to Damascus from Abadan using the Tehran-Damascus flight number, and on June 8 and 15 from Tehran while using the now-defunct Najaf-Tehran number. Since then, the airline’s flights to Damascus have multiplied in number and frequency, with the most recent one leaving from Yazd but broadcasting a Tehran-Damascus flight number, on July 29.

Deal supporters argue that Boeing’s jets won’t be used to shuttle troops to Syria, and that Iran needs the new planes to replace its aging fleet. Yet, in the past, Tehran has always subordinated its economy to its revolutionary goals, enlisting state companies and the private sector to support illicit activities that advanced the regime’s agenda. Given Tehran’s continuing role as the chief sponsor of the Syrian regime, there is no reason to believe a firewall can be erected between Iran’s continuing airlift to Assad and Iran Air’s commercial flights

Under the JCPOA, Iran is certainly entitled to buy aircraft. Given the critical role Iran’s commercial aircraft have played in exacerbating Syria’s humanitarian disaster and perpetuating its bloody civil war, Boeing should think twice before doing business with the world’s foremost state sponsor of terrorism.

Emanuele Ottolenghi is a Senior Fellow for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Follow him on Twitter @eottolenghi

Issues:

Iran