Iran’s Strategy in Syria

“We must possess Syria. If the chain from Lebanon to here is cut, bad things will happen,” former Iranian president Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani said in a December 24, 2012 meeting with Iraq's special envoy to Iran.

Rafsanjani’s use of the word “chain” is instructive. The Alawite regime in Syria is not only the oldest state ally of the Islamic Republic, it also serves the strategic interests of Tehran as a bridge between Shi’ite interests spanning from Western Afghanistan to the Mediterranean.

Other Iranian officials, such as Qassem Suleimani, commander of the deadly Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF), have also stressed the importance of Syria as a core component of the Iranian-led “resistance” to Israel and the United States. Interestingly, during Suleimani’s September 4 address to Iran's Assembly of Experts, he identified the importance of Syria in challenging two Sunni Arab adversaries of the Islamic Republic: Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

Persian Gulf monarchies have increasingly strived to bring down the Assad regime.  They are alarmed over the emergence of the “Shi'ite Crescent,” which Syria helps bridge. In other words, Gulf Arab support to the Syrian rebels is an attempt to correct what they perceive as a grave imbalance of power in the region created since the US led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, which backfired on Washington and only served to empower Tehran.  Iran emerged consolidated and expanded its influence in western Afghanistan, and it helped secure power for the Shi’a in Baghdad, while keeping Iraq in a permanent state of crisis that further empowers Tehran. Seeking to prevent the further extension of Iranian power, Saudi Arabia and Qatar aim to upend Iran’s allies in Syria.

With Turkish and US assistance now flowing to the rebels, Tehran knows that its first and only priority in Syria is to ensure the survival of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. To that end, even as it struggles under the weight of international sanctions, Tehran extended loans and a generous line of credit to the Syrian government. Iran also dispatched military and intelligence advisers to help Syria's mukhabarat suppress the unrest, and the IRGC-QF to help direct the military efforts against an increasingly lethal collection of rebel factions. As the challenges to the Assad regime have mounted, Iran has also mobilized the Lebanese Hezbollah, a proxy funded and trained by Iran, along with organized Iraqi Shi’a volunteers, and even IRGC Ground Forces when deemed necessary. 

Remarkably, Rafsanjani recently condemned the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons. But this does not indicate an Iranian readiness to throw Assad under the bus. Suleimani has pledged the IRGC’s full support to the Syrian dictator while Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei earlier this month issued a brazen warning to Washington against the use of force in Syria. The recent inability to reach an international consensus, or even an American legislative consensus, on the use of force in Syria is likely to further stiffen Iran's resolve.

Ali Alfoneh is a Senior Fellow at Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.