Neglecting the Costs of Inaction

Ten years after the launch of the Iraq War, the litany of costs associated with this allegedly “failed” mission has been repeated ad infinitum: some 100,000 dead Iraqi civilians, more than 4,000 dead (and tens of thousands of wounded) American soldiers, supposedly irreparable damage to America’s global reputation and the fraying of our alliances, among many others.

Earning less attention, particularly here in Europe, are what the war gained the United States, the Iraqi people and the world. Namely, the overthrow of a fascistic, expansionist dictatorship that had invaded two of its neighbors, the replacement of a regime that was a declared enemy of the U.S. and its allies with one that — whatever its many faults — is neither, not to mention the belated bringing to justice of a genocidal maniac.

This is not the place to re-litigate Iraq. Rather, the 10th anniversary of the war to remove Saddam Hussein provides an opportunity to reflect upon not just the grave costs of war, but the equally, and often graver, costs of standing aside.

In general, it is easier to make the case against war than to argue for it, particularly after battle has commenced. War opponents can always point to the human toll of a conflict — measured in lost lives and limbs, displaced civilians, physical damage, money spent — to make their case that a particular war “was not worth” the cost.

This has not always been the case, as the plight of American pacifists (many of whom were imprisoned) during the World War I and II attests. But as American culture has become less jingoistic, and as unfettered media make the horrific human toll of war more visible to the public, opposing American military involvement no longer entails the social and, worse, legal repercussions that it once did.

Supporters of a war do not have such luxury. They are forced to argue in the abstract. While it is easy to enumerate the many tangible costs of waging a war, it is more difficult to explain the benefits of engaging in a particular military action. Moreover, war opponents can argue, usually with justification, that the total measure of a war’s costs is always unforeseeable. After Iraq, the full consequences of which few people (even virulent war opponents) could accurately predict, this argument has become even more persuasive.

This is as it should be. After all, the brunt of wars have always been borne by the men and women who put themselves in harm’s way, and it is the duty of American policymakers to ensure that the armed forces are used sparingly and only as a last resort. The burden of proof must always rest with those who argue for pulling the trigger.

Yet amidst all the talk about the cost of wars, it is necessary to pay attention to the costs of not fighting. These costs, in the absence of dead or wounded American soldiers, are never as apparent.

It is impossible to know, for instance, what the cost would have been of letting Saddam Hussein stay in power. To take but one possible negative externality, it’s highly likely that Moammar Khadafy, who gave up the development of weapons of mass destruction in response to Hussein’s eviction, would have maintained his arsenal and used it on his own people once they rebelled. But, then, it’s also an open question if Libyans would have ever risen up against him at all had the United States allowed the Iraqi despot to stay in power, thus sending the message that America would not lift a finger against Arab rulers who murdered their own people en masse.

Sadly, the costs of non-intervention only become concretely apparent once it is too late. That is, we only know what we might have prevented after the death tolls are racked up and the displaced civilians are registered with international aid agencies.

In Syria, an estimated 70,000 people have been slaughtered. It is Bashar Assad who is responsible for these atrocities, but the horror could have been abated had the United States acted to stop him. By our inaction, we have saved the U.S. Treasury around $500,000 for every Tomahawk missile that was not fired at Assad’s instruments of murder. Whether the deaths of ever increasing numbers of Syrians, the laying to waste of the Syrian state and the regional chaos that will ensue as this war progresses into its third year is worth the cost of doing nothing . . . well, that’s something for which President Obama will one day have to answer.

Thus, 10 years after the Iraq War, those of us who supported it have an obligation to reflect upon its costs. Three years into the bloody hell that is Syria’s ongoing nightmare, it is equally appropriate to ask that those advocating a hands-off approach evaluate the price of their position.

Kirchick is a Berlin-based fellow with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Follow him on Twitter @jkirchick.