Reflections on Brian Michael Jenkins’ ‘Would-Be Warriors’

Recently RAND released a new paper by Brian Michael Jenkins entitled Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Terrorist Radicalization in the United States Since September 11, 2001. The paper constitutes a competent contribution to the study of homegrown terrorism; it is worth reading for both its analysis and also the data set it contributes.

There are several aspects of the report that I would like to highlight, beginning with my criticisms:

• First, there are some small — though not fatal — problems with the study's data set. Forty-six cases are listed at the end of the paper, and Jenkins explains the methodology for inclusion in this way: “They all meet one simple criterion for inclusion in the list: They have resulted in indictments, in the United States or abroad.” However, Anwar al Awlaki is included in the data set even though he has never been indicted (leaving aside a June 2002 arrest warrant for making a false statement on a passport application that was subsequently rescinded); conversely, Hasan Akbar was excluded even though he was convicted by a military court of killing two fellow soldiers. If the study is going to include individuals like Awlaki who can clearly be classified as homegrown terrorists even though they have not been indicted, it should also include Ruben Shumpert, one of the first Westerners to join Somalia's al Shabaab. Shabaab even issued a martyrdom bio following Shumpert's death.

• Jenkins claims that “few of America's accused terrorists seem to have arrived at jihadism through a process of profound spiritual discernment. We have no metric for measuring faith, but the attraction of the jihadists' extremist ideology for these individuals appears to have had more to do with participating in action than with religious instruction.” In my view, this is unproven. I should note that Jenkins was kind enough to contribute a foreword last year to a study I co-authored that reaches a contrary conclusion: that various ideological indicators of radicalization contradict the view that religious ideology is irrelevant. (Jenkins also cites to my study in Would-Be Warriors, but for its demographic data rather than its ideological discussion.) Suffice it to say that without concrete data on this point, I am skeptical of claims that we know “sense of adventure” to be a predominant driver of homegrown terrorists.

• The study also concludes: “There are more than 3 million Muslims in the United States, and few more than 100 have joined jihad–one out of every 30,000–suggesting an American Muslim population that remains hostile to jihadist ideology and its exhortations to violence.” But on this point, I agree with a thoughtful critique written by Drew Conway: “We know … that this final assertion is not true; specifically, with regard to the numbers. The numbers, at best, only support the claim that domestic radicalization is very rarely observed. It does not suggest anything about the internal disposition of American Muslims. While this may actually be the case, simply … not observing a phenomenon cannot support this claim. The cliché, 'The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence,' is particularly applicable to small N problems.”

Criticisms aside, I recommend Jenkins's new study. Currently I'm working on a new paper with Drew Conway that makes use of the data set in Would-Be Warriors to measure a few other possible trends that we discern. You will hear more about this project in the coming months. For now, I would like to highlight a few aspects of Jenkins's report that I think are particularly worthwhile:

• Jenkins correctly notes that despite the spike of homegrown terrorism cases in 2009, it is not clear that this represents a new trend: “More cases of radicalization on US soil were reported in 2009 than in any year since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, but the number of cases, 13, hardly represents an explosion of radical fervor, especially since half of them involved lone individuals. Whether this indicates a trend remains to be seen, but jihadist recruiting will continue.” I have two hypotheses about the increase in homegrown terror cases, both of which are at this point unproven. First, I suspect that we may be seeing increasing connections between homegrown terrorists and transnational terror networks. Second, I suspect that evolving policing tactics could in part explain the spike in cases. Though there are a number of ways policing tactics could have changed, the likeliest seems to be a move away from the disruptive policing model that the US had adopted previously: the tendency to disrupt possible terrorist activity by charging suspected terrorists with any criminal offenses they have committed, rather than just terrorism offenses. (My colleague Kyle Dabruzzi and I dubbed this the “Al Capone model” of anti-terror policing.) If authorities are waiting longer to gather evidence, rather than charging earlier in the process — for example, via immigration violations — that would be relevant in explaining at least part of the spike in cases.

• Jenkins contextualizes current levels of terrorism through an interesting comparison to domestic terrorism in the 1970s. Relevant quote: “America's perception of the terrorist threat today differs greatly from the perception of 35 years ago. Current concerns are driven not by the little bombs of the 1970s but by fear of another event on the scale of 9/11 or of even more frightening scenarios involving terrorist use of biological or nuclear weapons.”

• Finally, Jenkins concludes with the valuable advice that our nation should not put its vulnerability on display: “Bin Laden would not have publicly attached himself to Abdulmutallab's failed bombing attempt unless he was persuaded that the young Nigerian had caused national upset-a tactical failure but a strategic success. As long as America's psychological vulnerability is on display, jihadists will find inspiration in the actions of individuals like Nidal Hasan and Umar Abdulmutallab. And more recruitment and terrorism will occur. Panic is the wrong message to send America's terrorist foes.” Indeed, one important aspect of the current conflict is developing greater societal resilience in the face of the terrorist threat, something that involves avoiding the temptation to overreact (through security measures or otherwise) to provocations. Another aspect of resiliency that Jenkins does not discuss in the report, but is nonetheless highly relevant, is diminishing the highly politicized atmosphere that has surrounded this country's discussions of terrorism.