April 1, 2013 | NOW Lebanon

Return to Realism

April 1, 2013 | NOW Lebanon

Return to Realism

Last Friday, Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, made a call to his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, resolving the dispute between the two countries following the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident. Addressing a regular Justice and Development party meeting on Tuesday, Erdogan proclaimed that Israel’s apology would “shift balances in the Middle East,” adding, “the point we have arrived at brings about a new equation in the Middle East. The equation will require Turkey in the peace process.”

This type of bluster was prevalent in the heady days of the so-called 'strategic depth' doctrine, which was to elevate Turkey to a position of prominence in the region through a policy of 'zero problems with neighbors.' However, since the eruption of the Arab uprisings, and especially the war in Syria, it’s become clear that this policy has totally collapsed, exposing Turkey’s severe limitations and vulnerabilities. Over the past two years, as the region changed around it, Ankara has had to readjust its regional posture and begrudgingly revert back to realism. The reconciliation with Israel, which was actually long in the making, thus represents a tacit turn away from 'strategic depth,' necessitated by geopolitical realities. However, if Erdogan’s statements since the agreement tell us anything, it’s that the Turkish premier is deeply uncomfortable with the move.

At its core, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s 'strategic depth' doctrine – on which he wrote a book with the same title – was a reconfiguration of Turkish foreign and security policies. It conceived of the region as a single, coherent cultural-historical continuum. Turkey’s geographical location, as well as its historical and cultural links to its neighbors, gave it strategic depth and allowed it to position itself as a central power, not merely a peripheral one. As Erdogan pursued this position of prominence, he turned to rapprochement with Iran and Syria, as well as to advocating the Palestinian cause to heighten his profile in the Arab world. Tension with Israel, in many ways, was inherent to the 'strategic depth' doctrine.

But Ankara eventually found out that the region itself resisted the fundamental premise of this doctrine. For instance, as Turkey supported the popular uprising against the Assad regime, it saw its relations with Iran deteriorate. The notion that cultural affinities would negate national interests, or, for that matter, historical rivalries, was absurd. The reverie of 'strategic depth' quickly gave way to traditional balance of power.

Mending the rift with Israel fits within this framework. Despite insisting that Israel “lift the siege” on Gaza before ties are restored, Erdogan in the end conceded that point and accepted the deal. Turkey’s Syria headache is probably responsible for changing Erdogan’s mind.

The collapse of the AKP’s Syria policy has exposed Turkish security. The Assad regime has targeted Turkey in numerous ways over the last two years, and the Turkish response has largely been muted. Perhaps the best example came when the regime shot down a Turkish jet last June, and all Ankara could do was to protest.

As Syria has collapsed, the security concerns have increased. Indeed, Netanyahu cited common security threat from the situation in Syria as an impetus for repairing ties, and thereby reestablishing intelligence cooperation.

Old habits die hard, however. Erdogan and Davutoglu are loath to admit that the doctrine on which they built Turkey’s self-image for the last decade is a total flop. Having to admit that Turkey is, in fact, vulnerable and would benefit from realigning with Israel seems to be too big a pill to swallow. It was hardly surprising then to hear Davutoglu deny any relation between the agreement with Israel and Turkey’s Syria and Iran policies.

Erdogan’s renewed emphasis on Palestinian affairs and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is, in that sense, an indicator of his discomfort with the reconciliation. The Turkish premier wants to spin the deal with Israel to show that Turkey not only 'forced' Israel’s hand, but also that it is now a primary interlocutor on Gaza and a central actor in the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. To that effect, Yalcin Akdogan, one of Erdogan’s top advisors, laid out the Prime Minister’s thinking: “Turkey has become an important actor in the solution of the Palestinian question… Turkey’s presence can also help Hamas to be more active in the process.”

To be precise, Erdogan wants to present himself as the principal mediator with Hamas, as well as the sponsor of Palestinian unity. He has also made it known that he wishes to visit Gaza, and perhaps bring Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas with him. But neither the Palestinian Authority nor the US State Department seem too thrilled with the idea. Egypt, too, will not much appreciate Erdogan moving in on its turf.

The mere fact that Erdogan considers Hamas Turkey’s ticket to relevance itself is telling. It’s not just that the notion of a peace process involving Hamas remains in the realm of fantasy. It’s also that the Palestinians’ value as a platform has plummeted in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. After all, let’s not forget that the US, to say nothing of the major Arab states like Saudi Arabia, didn’t so much as utter a peep when Israel smashed Hamas last November.

It does speak to Erdogan’s fundamental discomfort with being forced by regional realities to align with Israel. And that might prove to be a problem. For instance, how will a slighted Turkish premier react when his Hamas fantasy, too, comes crashing down?

Indeed, whether Turkey and its volatile Prime Minister will be able to fully make the shift to realism away from a fanciful doctrine that has defined the AKP era and which continues to shape how Ankara conceives its broader role, is the central question. The answer will determine the longevity and sustainability of the agreement with Israel – an agreement that Turkey very much needs, even if it won’t admit it.

Tony Badran is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He tweets @AcrossTheBay.

Issues:

Syria Turkey