Syrian Pretension And Reality in Iraq

Recent news reports about the arduous process of government formation in Iraq suggest that a deal may be in the works that would see incumbent Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki keep his post. If true, it would be a telling indicator of the balance of power, not only in Iraq, but also in the region, reflecting who the actual influential actors are, and highlighting the severe limitations of Arab influence, specifically Syrian pretensions, in Iraq.

About three weeks ago, reports surfaced in the Syrian and Saudi-owned media about an imminent meeting to be held in Damascus that is “strongly backed” by Riyadh and would bring together Iraq’s major political figures in order to hold a “Syrian Taif Accord” with an “Iraqi flavor,” in reference to the Saudi-sponsored meetings that brokered an agreement to end the Lebanese civil war in 1989.

The Syrian media dubbed the proposal a joint Saudi-Syrian-Turkish initiative, allegedly also backed by Russia. Syria’s publicists quickly began hailing its “pivotal” role as “the ultimate broker” in Iraqi affairs, as befits Damascus’ supposed status as a regional “heavyweight.” Syria’s mouthpieces were joined by Iraqi Baathist elements in Damascus as well as by some spokespeople of Iyad Allawi’s al-Iraqiya parliamentary coalition, one of whom expressed hope that an Iraqi government would emerge similar to the Lebanese one after the Doha Accord in 2008.

Quite explicitly, one Syrian publicist who regularly reflects official talking points described the purpose of this “Syrian Taif” as being “to find a replacement to Maliki” – a constant Syrian refrain, and a meeting point with Saudi Arabia, which afforded the Syrians cover as they pursued a year-long campaign of violence against Maliki.

But as is usually the case, the gap between Syrian pretension and reality is quite significant. Even as Syrian media highlighted a story claiming that Maliki secretly led a delegation to Damascus to meet with Assad in order to discuss the impending Damascus meeting, a member of Maliki’s State of Law coalition denied the prime minister made such a trip and stated that only he himself had gone to Damascus, in his own capacity, in order to convey that “Iraqis were against an Iraqi Taif.”

The prospects for the Damascus meeting were already doubtful, as Kurdish officials had also rejected the idea, especially since Syria has had a “negative, destructive role” in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein, as one Kurdish politician put it. Moreover, the Kurds had other grounds for rejecting the initiative, as it was actually conceived by Turkey all along. Syria merely, if typically, tried to claim center stage at someone else’s show.

And now, the whole “Syrian Taif” charade seems to be over. Instead, we learn from an official Iraqi statement (and not from the Syrians) that Syrian Prime Minister Naji Otri called Maliki last week – the first such communication since relations soured last August. While Damascus’s flacks tried to sell this development as somehow indicating a critical Syrian blessing for solving the Iraqi government-formation process, which would now see Maliki attending the fabled “Syrian Taif” conference (one Qatari report claimed Otri invited the Iraqi premier to do so), in fact, this is all hollow bluster. State of Law officials stated on Tuesday that Maliki would visit Syria “at a later time” – meaning after he officially returns as prime minister, probably as part of an official regional tour.

In reality, the Syrian call is an admission of its marginality in Iraq. This comes as reports have surfaced that the US was pushing for a deal that would see Maliki return as the head of a coalition government with the Kurds and Allawi’s al-Iraqiya.

Despite the carnage unleashed by the Syrians in order to destroy him, Maliki has managed to make himself uncircumventable in the domestic power game, even to the Iranians, whose Shia allies are simply too weak to credibly unseat the incumbent premier. In this context, Allawi’s admission that he sought intervention with Iran in his favor was rather telling. The Syrians were never first-tier players. This was also evident in the fact that even the idea to hold a broad conference on Syrian soil was actually a Turkish initiative to begin with.

Similarly, the Saudi calculation has also proved naïve. If their idea was to counterbalance Iranian influence by teaming up with Syria, then it was a fool’s errand from the get-go. This is so not only because of Syria’s enduring strategic alliance with Iran, but also because Syria simply does not possess assets in Iraq to counter Iran even if it wanted to. And so, if Iran should conclude that Maliki is the only game in town, the Syrians have no choice in the matter.

This regional picture highlights the absurdity of the logic distilled in the 2006 Iraq Study Group report, which called for giving regional states a “stake” in Iraqi affairs as the US withdrew.

Perhaps now the US can form a more accurate and realistic reading of the regional balance of power, and can be more assertive in securing its advantage and maintaining primary influence in Iraq, despite its military withdrawal.

Tony Badran is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies