The Syrian Conundrum

As the Syrian uprising enters its 17th month and the casualty toll mounts dramatically, Western inability to address the crisis, beyond strong rhetoric and sanctions, risks further harming Western interests in the region.

Against the alacrity by which other powers have responded actively to the crisis through financial, diplomatic and military support for the side they favor, the United States and the European Union have done little to directly impact the outcome of the latest (and so far most gruesome) chapter of the so-called Arab Spring.

The reasons against some type of Western military involvement are all sound and sensible. 

Syria’s opposition appear divided, weak, ineffectual. The presence of al-Qaeda elements and the strength of Islamist forces within the opposition suggest that the toppling of the Assad dynasty may give way to an even worse regime.

The sectarian character of the country indicates, to opponents of any military intervention, that Syria could slide into anarchy if the regime were removed – the spillover effect of this development could destabilize Lebanon, Iraq and potentially also Turkey.The ensuing anarchy would leave the vast stockpiles of Syria’s weapons – including, crucially, its WMD arsenal – up for grabs among the warring factions.

By contrast, despite ongoing violence and distressful evidence of atrocities, the regime still controls vast swathes of Syrian territory – a stark difference with the early phases of the Libyan uprising,when the opposition controlled Benghazi and its environs, making it possible for aid shipments to reach them. 

If the conflict escalated as a result of Western intervention, the Assad regime could seek to spread it by transferring Scud missiles to Hezbollah and trying to draw Israel into the fight.

Finally, against those invoking the Libya precedent, Syria’s much more difficult terrain and demographics are referred to as significant impediments.

On the other hand, supporters of a more robust in- tervention are appalled by Western inaction in the face of atrocities that could amount to crimes against humanity. Especially after last year, when US President Barack Obama explained his support for military intervention in Libya against the background of impending massacres – not preventing Muammar Gaddafi’s takeover of Benghazi would have been, in his words “a stain on the conscience of the world” that would “reverberate across the region” – it is hard to explain why Western countries cannot contemplate supplying rebels with weapons, offering them training and financial support, providing them with a no-fly zone of the type that worked in northern Iraq during the 1991-2003 period, or joining the fight more directly.

Beyond humanitarian claims, there are hard-nosed political advantages cited in favor of arming, supporting, defending, and possibly deploying alongside the rebels.

Syria has become a playground for regional tensions, much in the way Lebanon did at the height of its civil war.

Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey are trying to support those they favor to come up on top – chiefly the Muslim Brotherhood – as a way to increase their influence. For Saudi Arabia, the desire to punish Bashar al-Assad also stems from his closeness to Iran and the disruptive role this strategic relation has had for Riyadh.

Iran is naturally involved in the fight – alongside financial aid and arms shipments, Iran is rumored to have deployed Special Forces from the Revolutionary Guards’ overseas operations branch, the Quds Forces. Hezbollah fighters are also reported to be participating in the fighting and are helping Syria on the Lebanese side of the border by going after Syrian fugitives. At a time of structural weakness for Tehran, when sanctions are beginning to seriously hurt the regime, losing such a strategic asset as Syria (which would likely un- dermine their hold on Lebanon as well) could yield significant strategic advantages to the West, especially at a time of difficult negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program.

Russia, too, has chosen to take a much more active profile in the fight as a country which still seeks to re- assert its lost influence in the region and which sees

Syria as an important client for economic reasons (weapons’ sales), as well as strategic ones (Russia’s naval basing rights). Russia still plays global politics by the rules of the post-Westphalian order rather than the post-Kantian paradise codified by the United Nations, and will not let a loyal proxy fall so easily. The same goes for Iran.

What is then the price of in-action? And what are the ramifications of intervention?

Inaction will not make things manageable – those who invoke the Libya precedent to say that matters will get worse if the West seeks to undermine the regime forget that things have already gotten significantly worse since the beginning of the uprising. What they fear could happen if outside powers deployed military force to un-seat the regime is actually happening already – Assad’s regime is actively stoking sectarian tensions to its own advantage, through the brutal actions of his irregular forces, the Shabiha.

The flow of refugees and the transformation of the Syrian civil war into a regional chessboard among rival powers will spill over sooner or later regardless of whether the West intervenes or stands by. The danger that sectarianism may engulf ethnic communities across the border – the Kurds first and foremost – is al- ready real. If left unchecked, the current turmoil will spread. If Assad eventually manages to quell the revolt, Iran will also emerge emboldened and Western credibility and influence in the region will hit a new low.

Intervention is costly and the objections are equally compelling though – Assad’s successors’ gratitude to the West will grow thin fairly quickly. Those among them with Islamist inclinations may prevail, as has happened in elsewhere in the Maghreb. Their outlook, while not necessarily pro-Iranian, will not become friendlier to the West. And under the fog of war and a looming defeat, a dying regime may seriously contemplate using chemical and biological weapons, transferring them to their Lebanese proxies, or unleashing a war against Israel to tip the regional balance of sympathy in their favor.

Whether it would work is debatable, but they may try – and the consequences will be unpleasant.

Given the above, what alternatives are available?

First, instead of relying on the stillborn Annan plan or the hope of a piloted change at the top à la Yemen, which Russia could help midwife, the West should consider regime decapitation – the assassination of the tyrant.

Secondly, a more robust supply of weapons that can countenance the regime’s superiority should be a high priority – if a little over 300 Stinger shoulder missiles brought down the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s, surely similar technology can help the rebels defeat the Russian helicopter gunships the regime has purportedly received from Moscow.

And thirdly, the creation of humanitarian corridors and buffer zones along Syria’s border with Turkey could alleviate civilian suffering and chip away at the regime’s confidence.

Nothing stays static in the Middle East. The price of inaction may turn out to be as costly as the one of intervention – and unfortunately, it bears the added cost of the moral bankruptcy of the bystander as cruelty runs amok.

Emanuele Ottolenghi is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies

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