Turkey’s Strategy in Syria

“The Assad regime has not lived up to any of its pledges, it has won time for new massacres and continues to do so,” said Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in a speech in Istanbul on September 11. Erdogan’s expression of outrage was a response to the suggestion that the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad might avert a U.S. military strike by surrendering his chemical weapons.

Erdogan’s words not only reflect his personal disappointment in what he considers Western indecisiveness on Syria, but also his personal failure to realize his own foreign policy. Erdogan's goal was “zero problems” with his neighbors. This doctrine was designed to enable Turkey to emerge as a power broker between the West and the Middle East and North Africa. Among other things, Erdogan hoped to help integrate the Middle East's nascent Muslim Brotherhood governments to become respected members of the international community.  The fall of Mohammed Morsi in Egypt was a blow to his vision.  Similarly, the inability to engineer regime change in Syria, and to replace the Assad regime with a Brotherhood government, is another setback.

Turkey initially sought to shape the outcome of the unrest in Syria by promoting political, social and economic reforms that might pave the path to a stable Muslim Brotherhood-led government in Damascus. That goal proved elusive, as the regime increasingly resorted to violence against the opposition, Turkey further allowed the Syrian opposition leaders to convene in Antalya and Istanbul in the summer of 2011. Turkey then formally cut diplomatic relations with Syria. By the spring of 2012, the Turkish government began providing support for the armed struggle in Syria and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu officially recognized the Syrian rebels as the government of Syria.

But Turkey's maneuvers have not changed the outcome in Syria. The resiliency of the Assad regime has been a thorn in the side of Ankara, which also seems to have underestimated Iran’s resolve to secure regime survival in Damascus. Turkey further appears to have overestimated the importance of Washington's declared redlines.

As Turkey's intended outcomes appear increasingly less likely, Erdogan now appears to be playing defense, seeking to prevent the worst possible outcomes. For Turkey, the nightmare scenario is the breakup of Syria and emergence of autonomous Kurdish zones that threaten Turkey’s territorial integrity.

For the foreseeable future, Turkey is likely to continue its financial, diplomatic, and military support to the Sunni opposition in Syria. It is unclear whether Turkey has included Salafi or even Jihadi groups among those that receive its financial backing. Despite their reported zeal and prowess on the battlefield, this course of action will not get Turkey any closer to its strategic goal but rather perpetuate instability in post-Assad Syria.

Ali Alfoneh is a Senior Fellow at Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.