Qatar and Terror Finance
Part I: Negligence

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Executive Summary

Qatar’s performance in the fight against terror finance tests the notion that it is a reliable friend and ally. Despite its tiny size, Doha is now being described by some U.S. officials as the region’s biggest source of private donations to radical groups in Syria and Iraq.\(^1\) The U.S. government’s top official for combating terror finance confirmed in October after visiting Qatar that they still “have more work to do” and that Qatari nationals under U.S. and U.N. sanctions on charges of terror finance currently enjoy legal impunity.\(^2\) In September, a Western diplomat in Doha told the press that “there are eight to 12 key figures in Qatar raising millions of pounds for the jihadis,” much of it going to al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate the Nusra Front or even the Islamic State.\(^3\)

Qatar’s terror finance problem is the result of weak enforcement. It reflects a serious lack of political will and represents a grave threat to U.S. interests. This three-part report identifies over twenty individuals under U.S. or U.N. sanctions who have benefitted from some form of Qatari negligence or support. Frequently, the impact of those policies has had global spillover.

Qatar’s historical legacy of negligence against terror finance stretches back over two decades. Doha mishandled al-Qaeda’s old guard in the lead-up to 9/11, making those events more rather than less likely. In recent months, there has been considerable focus on Abdulrahman al-Nuaymi, a Qatari national who has been blacklisted by the United States, United Nations, and European Union on charges of financing al-Qaeda.\(^4\) Reports indicate that Nuaymi is still a free man in Qatar, presumably because of his extensive ties to Doha’s ruling elite.\(^5\) This report reveals new details about several other major Qatar-based terror finance cases over the past decade in which Doha’s policies fell considerably short of full enforcement, allowing suspected terror financiers to continue their activities after coming under initial scrutiny. This report also explains why Qatar’s mishandling of these cases cannot be attributed to a lack of institutional capacity or societal opposition but instead must be understood as willful negligence on the part of Qatari authorities.

Because of the sheer volume of material on Qatar’s terror finance challenges, FDD’s Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance will release two additional documents after this one. Part Two takes a recent list of U.S. terror finance designations from September as a jumping off point for demonstrating how private terror finance networks linked to Qatar still appear to be intact.\(^6\) Part

Three explains why it is up to Washington to change Doha’s strategic calculus and reveals how sustained, high-level terror finance networks with links to Qatari territory have benefitted al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups in Syria, Gaza, Somalia, Yemen, Egypt, South Asia, and Iraq. The international community cannot successfully defeat terrorist groups such as the Islamic State, the Khorasan Group, and other manifestations of al-Qaeda’s malevolent ideology until private terror finance of this sort is significantly curtailed.

Introduction

In his first international interview since ascending to power, Qatar’s 34-year-old emir told CNN on September 25, 2014: “I know that in America and some countries they look at some movements as terrorist movements... But there are differences.”

Many observers assumed that he was referring to the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas, which a top Treasury official says Qatar has “openly financed” for years. But as this report will demonstrate, Hamas is just one of many extremist networks that benefit from Qatar-based financiers and lax Qatari enforcement.

It is certainly true that Qatari jets have provided symbolic participation in the airpower mission against the Islamic State. However, Qatar’s representatives reportedly sat down to negotiate with terrorists from al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in September and still seem to be mediating between Lebanon and these groups on its border. Additionally, government officials from...
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Doha, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen declared that Qatar and Kuwait “still have more work to do” if they do not want to be considered “permissive jurisdictions for terrorist financing.” He also revealed that “there are U.S. and U.N.-designated terrorist financiers in Qatar that have not been acted against under Qatari law.”

With every important case of suspected terror finance involving a Qatari national in past years, the government in Doha has refused to effectively crack down. The current crop of terror financiers appear to be operating with similar impunity.

Abdulrahman al-Nuaymi

In December of 2013, the United States imposed targeted financial sanctions on a prominent Qatari national named Abdulrahman al-Nuaymi. The Treasury designated Nuaymi as a “Specially Designated Terrorist” under Executive Order 13224, which authorizes the freezing of U.S. assets of individuals who “assist in, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support” for terrorist acts or organizations.

When the U.S. government announces the designation of individuals or organizations of this sort, Treasury typically issues a press release to explain its reasoning based on vetted and declassified intelligence. The U.S. announcement of Nuaymi’s designation alleged that he transferred millions of dollars over a decade to al-Qaeda affiliates in Iraq, Syria, Somalia, and Yemen.

It also stated that he funded Asbat al-Ansar, a Lebanese terrorist group associated with al-Qaeda and blacklisted in 2001, and that he once provided $2 million a month to IS’s forerunner, al-Qaeda in Iraq. The release goes back farther than that, extending back for over two decades. Indeed, with every important case of suspected terror finance involving a Qatari national in past years, the government in Doha has refused to effectively crack down. The current crop of terror financiers appear to be operating with similar impunity.

November 21, 2014
indicated that he recently provided $600,000 and
intended to send another $50,000 to Abu Khaled al-
Suri, described as al-Qaeda leader Ayman Zawahiri’s
emissary in Syria. Finally, it stated that at one point he
provided $250,000 to leaders of the Somali terrorist
group al-Shabaab, including one individual who was
personally subject to international terrorism sanctions
by the United Nations.

Following Washington’s lead in 2014, Nuaymi was
also blacklisted by the U.N. (September 23), Turkey
(September 30), European Union (October 8), and
United Kingdom (October 9).20 Prior to his American
designation, Nuaymi was also reportedly banned from
colorful to Saudi Arabia for unknown reasons.21

Since the designation, Qatari authorities have given
little public indication that they take Nuaymi’s
case seriously. He was in Istanbul at the time of the
designations but within a matter of days returned to
Doha, where he held a press conference at the Arab
Center for Research and Policy Studies, a state-funded
think tank considered close to the regime.22 At that
event, he professed his innocence, bragging that he
would not suffer any criminal or legal penalties over
the designation and insisting local authorities would
23

Beast, December 20, 2013. (http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2013/12/20/terrorists-for-human-rights.html)
25. Robert Mendick, “Al-Qaeda Terror Financier Worked for
Qatari Government,” The Telegraph (UK), October 12, 2014.
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/11156327/Al-Qaeda-terror-
financier-worked-for-Qatari-government.html)
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Al Raya (Qatar), December 24, 2013. (http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/
turkey-adds-more-than-a-dozen-names-to-al-qaeda-list.aspx?pagelD=238&nID=72407&NewsCatID=338) & David Brown, “Qatari
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(U.K.), October 20, 2014; (http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/
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Sanctions Targets in the UK,” Her Majesty’s Treasury Website,
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20, 2013. (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4f6bd02a-68f2-11e3-
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uk/crime/article4214328.ece) & “Consolidated List of Financial
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sanctionsconlist.htm)
Beast, December 20, 2013. (http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2013/12/20/terrorists-for-human-rights.html)
Alleged al-Qaeda Links,” The Financial Times (U.K.), December
20, 2013. (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4f6bd02a-68f2-11e3-
bb3e-00144fcaabdc0.html#axzz3GnD0c82m) &
“At Parley, Palestinians Cite Lack of Shared Vision,”
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uk/crime/article4214328.ece) & “Consolidated List of Financial
Sanctions Targets in the UK,” Her Majesty’s Treasury Website,
sanctionsconlist.htm)
has been a critic of the regime as well as a recipient of its largesse, playing a senior leadership role in institutions considered close to the regime. In short, Nuaymi has many connections to the ruling elite.

Yet Qatari authorities had no qualms about imprisoning Nuaymi in the past simply for exercising his right to free speech. When he was an employee of Qatar's Education Ministry, he was arrested on June 16, 1998 and held for nearly three years without trial for submitting a petition to Qatar's appointed legislative council that criticized the role of women in society, including the emir's wife. His petition, which warned that "un-Islamic mingling of the sexes" would lead to women "turning into men," was also signed by three members of the royal family.

According to the State Department, Nuaymi's arrest was ordered by the emir himself. He was later pardoned by the emir and released in March or April of 2001, after Islamist activists in Britain mounted demonstrations for his release. When he was set free, the emir reportedly received Nuaymi in person, "describing him as an old friend who was directly responsible for arranging Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani's meetings with men of Islamic political thought," including Abdulmajeed al-Zindani, the head of Yemen's Muslim Brotherhood and a former mentor to bin Laden, as well as Hamas founder Ahmed Yassin.

Today Zindani is on the U.N.'s al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee list; Hamas is sanctioned for terrorism by the United States and European Union. According to Nuaymi's résumé on Qatar University's website, the school gave him a promotion the year after his release from prison. The university was founded by the country's emir in 1973 and is supported heavily by Qatar's oil wealth. The State Department notes that Nuaymi's arrest was ordered by the emir himself.

27. Some reports suggest he was arrested again for three years in 2009, but the terms of that supposed arrest are oddly similar to his first arrest (the same length of time, also for petitioning the shura council in opposition to coeducation). Further, conflicting accounts suggest he was actually still out of jail in 2010.

28. The State Department notes that Nuaymi's arrest was ordered by the emir himself.


by the state. Sometime between then and 2004, he was appointed president of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS), which is close to the regime and believed to be funded by the state. The organization’s current general director, Azmi Bishara, was granted Qatari citizenship after fleeing his native Israel under suspicion of selling state secrets to Hezbollah; he now is described as a “court intellectual in Doha” who advises the ruler on Syria, Libya, and Palestinian affairs. Both Bishara and Nuaymi have hosted senior Hamas leaders such as Khaled Meshal to speak at ACRPS events. When, Nuaymi held a press conference to profess his innocence after being sanctioned by the United States, he convened the event at ACRPS.

Nuaymi also used his think tank position to launch an NGO called the Global Anti-Aggression Coalition (GAAC). The group maintains it is nonviolent, though it has convened conferences to support the “resistance” in Iraq, Somalia, and Gaza and aspired to hold a similar event on Afghanistan. Under Nuaymi’s leadership, the GAAC issued a 2009 document pledging to support the Iraqi “resistance” against foreign occupiers (ACRPS was one of its signatories). In 2010, Nuaymi spoke at a GAAC summit focused on “resistance until victory” alongside Harith Dhari, an Iraqi Sunni designated by the U.S. in 2008 on charges of financing al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Nuaymi issued a GAAC statement from Doha in 2008 advocating “resistance in all its forms” against Israel, and the group’s 2009 Gaza conference pledged victory through jihad. Also in 2009, Nuaymi endorsed an even more extreme position by signing onto a petition alongside radical Gulf-based clerics such as Nabil al-Awadhi and Wagdy Ghoneim that accused the Egyptian government of apostasy for cooperating with Israel, authorized “jihad
in all of Palestine,” and instructed Muslims to kill all the Jews there and seize their property.\textsuperscript{43}

GAAC’s Somalia conference in 2007 also took place under Nuaymi’s supervision and included leaders of Somalia’s now-defunct Islamic Courts Union, whose so-called “jihad” received the blessing of al-Qaeda.\textsuperscript{44} According to U.S. officials, the event in Doha had at least “the tacit blessing” of the Qatari government.\textsuperscript{45} Upon Nuaymi’s designation in December, the GAAC released a statement rejecting the measure as part of America’s “wars against Islam and Muslims.”\textsuperscript{46}

In 2004, Nuaymi also co-founded a rights group named Alkarama (“dignity”) in Geneva. Nuaymi served as president of its board until his 2013 U.S. designation.\textsuperscript{47} He is still listed as one of Alkarama’s “founding members.”\textsuperscript{48} His replacement, a Qatari businessman named Khalifa Rabaan, also appears to have been a longtime member of the GAAC board.\textsuperscript{49} An individual described as Alkarama’s top official in Yemen, who was designated in December 2013 alongside Nuaymi, was accused by the U.S. of having served as al-Qaeda’s acting emir for Yemen’s Bayda Province.\textsuperscript{50}

Nuaymi held prominent roles in several other Qatari organizations as well, which also highlight his ties to the Qatari elite. These include his role as a founding board member of the Eid bin Mohammed Al Thani Charitable Association, a past board member of Qatar Islamic Bank, and past president of the Qatar Football Association. In 2010, the Qatar Olympic Committee even gave Nuaymi a lifetime achievement award for his contributions to sport.\textsuperscript{51} The Olympic Committee’s president at the time was Tamim, the current emir.\textsuperscript{52} The Eid bin Mohammed Al Thani Charitable Association has been described as “probably the biggest and most influential activist Salafi-controlled relief organization in the world.”\textsuperscript{53} Israel banned the charity in 2008 for allegedly funding Hamas.\textsuperscript{54} One of the group’s officials

\textsuperscript{43} Mokhtsar, January 14, 2009 (http://www.almokhtsar.com/node/9306)


\textsuperscript{51} “الشيخ حمد بن ناصر شخصية الموسم الرياضي,” Al Raya (Qatar), May 23, 2010. (http://www.raya.com/home/print/f6451603-4df4-4ca1-9c10-122741d1743279f2940a-f4e0-4662-b870-c43cd3cf4542)


\textsuperscript{54} Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Release, “Defense
was photographed with Hamas leader Ismail Haniyah as recently as last year and frequently posts material on social media glorifying Hamas’s military wing.55

U.S. officials noted in 2007 that Nuaymi was “closely watched because of his hard-line tendencies.”56 The Treasury Department alleges that he has funded al-Qaeda since at least 2003.57 Nevertheless, while even Turkey and the United Nations have sanctioned Nuaymi on such charges, Doha refuses to arrest him, a choice that speaks volumes about its priorities on terror finance.

Al-Qaeda’s Old Guard

Qatar’s Persian Gulf rival Saudi Arabia bears significant responsibility for the events leading to 9/11. The


55. @abumoha25853380, (https://twitter.com/abumoha25853380/status/525975436175272333) @abumoha25853380، لقاء مع الأخ اسماعيل هنية في فندق شيرتون الدوحة يوم الاثنين لقاء خاص عن غزة#غزة فلسطين هنية "، Twitter, April 24, 2013. ([https://twitter.com/abumoha25853380/status/326975436175272333](https://twitter.com/abumoha25853380/status/326975436175272333))


57. @abumoha25853380, (https://twitter.com/abumoha25853380/status/326975436175272333) @abumoha25853380، لقاء مع الأخ اسماعيل هنية في فندق شيرتون الدوحة يوم الاثنين لقاء خاص عن غزة#غزة فلسطين هنية "، Twitter, April 24, 2013. ([https://twitter.com/abumoha25853380/status/326975436175272333](https://twitter.com/abumoha25853380/status/326975436175272333))


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Qatar Charity as a “terrorism support entity” worth monitoring because it had previously “demonstrated intent and willingness” to provide financial or operational support to terrorist organizations.\textsuperscript{61}

According to the U.S. Defense Department, al-Qaeda operative Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) moved to Qatar in 1993 at the suggestion of its Minister of Islamic Affairs and Endowments, Abdullah bin Khalid bin Hamad Al Thani, a prominent member of the royal family.\textsuperscript{62} KSM, who fought in Afghanistan alongside Osama bin Laden, Ayman Zawahiri, and Abdullah Azzam, found employment at Qatar’s Ministry of Electricity and Water. KSM would go on to become the mastermind of 9/11 and numerous other al-Qaeda attacks.\textsuperscript{63}

According to the 9/11 Commission report, KSM provided financial support to the Bosnian jihad in 1992 shortly before arriving in Qatar and wired money from Qatari territory to his nephew Ramzi Yousef for use in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.\textsuperscript{64} KSM also planned al-Qaeda’s 1994-95 “Operation Bojinka” to blow up airliners from the Philippines and allegedly received funding from Abdullah bin Khalid Al Thani to fight in the Bosnian jihad in 1995.\textsuperscript{65} Former CIA operative Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) moved to Qatar in 1993 at the suggestion of its Minister of Islamic Affairs and Endowments, Abdullah bin Khalid bin Hamad Al Thani, a prominent member of the royal family.\textsuperscript{62} KSM, who fought in Afghanistan alongside Osama bin Laden, Ayman Zawahiri, and Abdullah Azzam, found employment at Qatar’s Ministry of Electricity and Water. KSM would go on to become the mastermind of 9/11 and numerous other al-Qaeda attacks.\textsuperscript{63}

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The U.S. repeatedly asked Qatar’s foreign minister, Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani, for permission to arrest KSM, but permission was slow in coming.\textsuperscript{70} Qatari officials assured Washington that KSM was under surveillance,\textsuperscript{71} however.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{61} “Qatar Commits USD 40 Million for UN Operations in Gaza,” Wikileaks, March 12, 2009. (www.wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09DOHA314.html)
\item \textsuperscript{66} Robert Baer, Sleeping with the Devil: How Washington Sold Our Soul for Saudi Crude, (Santa Barbara, California: Three Rivers Press, 2004), page 18.
\item \textsuperscript{71} Steven Strasser & Craig R. Whitney, The 9/11 Investigations:
\end{itemize}
yet by the time the U.S. received permission for a raid in early 1996, he was no longer in the country. ABC News quoted American intelligence officials indicating that Qatari minister Abdullah bin Khalid Al Thani had tipped off KSM, and that KSM left the country with a passport provided by the Qatari government on a private jet. According to Baer, al-Qaeda leaders such as Zawahiri and al-Qaeda military chief Mohammed Atif may also have received blank Qatari passports.

Abdullah bin Khalid Al Thani got away with a slap on the wrist, briefly confined to house arrest, but in 1996 he was promoted to Minister of State for Internal Affairs. He then received another promotion in 2001 to Interior Minister (a position he held until 2013) and also served as a member of Qatar's Family Council, the body formally responsible for approving the elevation of Tamim to emir last year. Early this year, when Abdullah bin Khalid was promoted to Minister of State for Internal Affairs.

Al Thani's son got married, he threw his son a party attended by former emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, who posed for family pictures together and apparently sat alongside Abdullah during the ceremony.

Al-Qaeda's early relationship with Qatari royals may extend further. A letter submitted by the Defense Department to Congress in 2003 cited reports that “Bin Laden visited Doha, Qatar (17-19 Jan. 1996), staying at the residence of a member of the Qatari ruling family. He discussed the successful movement of explosives into Saudi Arabia, and operations targeted against U.S. and U.K. interests in Dammam, Dharan, and Khobar.” U.S. officials have also cited intelligence reports stating that from 1996 to 2000 Osama bin Laden visited Abdullah bin Khalid in Qatar twice. Saudi intelligence, which understandably may have an axe to grind with Qatar, claimed that KSM spent two weeks sheltering in Qatar in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks “with the help of prominent patrons.”

A former CIA official further claims that there were others in the Qatari royal family besides Abdullah bin Khalid Al Thani “who were sympathetic and provided safe havens for Al Qaeda.” Indeed, in 2003 officials...
from an unidentified U.S.-allied government indicated that Abdul Karim Al Thani, another member of the royal family, operated a Qatari safe house for Abu Musab Zarqawi on his travel between Afghanistan and Iraq, providing Qatari passports and $1 million to support Zarqawi’s group. Zarqawi would go on to found IS’s forerunner, al-Qaeda in Iraq, as well as endorsing a 2005 suicide bombing in Doha, apparently by his onetime adherents, that killed a British teacher. Several weeks later, London’s *Sunday Times* quoted a Qatari official saying the attack had convinced Doha to revive a 2003 agreement to pay off religious leaders close to al-Qaeda – funds that the paper suggested may have helped finance al-Qaeda’s operations in Iraq – so that the organization would keep Qatar out of its crosshairs.

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, one additional episode raised questions about Qatar’s seriousness in confronting al-Qaeda. Six days after the attacks, Doha detained Ahmed Hikmat Shakir, who had previously come to the attention of American officials for being an associate of two of the hijackers. Upon searching his person and apartment, Qatari authorities found contact information for a range of top al-Qaeda operatives linked to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, Operation Bojinka, the 1998 twin U.S. embassy bombings in Africa, and the 2000 U.S.S. Cole attack. Although FBI officials were eager to interview Shakir, Qatar quickly released him, and he returned to his native Iraq via Jordan. Before his arrest, Shakir had been working in Doha at the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Endowments.

**The Marri Brothers**

In 2009, a cable signed by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton indicated that Saudi Arabia was a greater source of private terror finance than Doha, in part due to the sheer discrepancy in size between the two countries’ populations. Still, it noted, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Lashkar-e-Taiba all “exploit Qatar as a fundraising locale.” It also noted Qatari “terror finance related to Hamas” was an even more pressing problem than finance to South Asia. Since then, U.S. officials claim tiny Qatar may have eclipsed Saudi Arabia to become the biggest source of private donations to radical groups in Syria and Iraq.
The last decade has been a difficult one for bilateral cooperation against terror finance. As Clinton noted in her 2009 memo, Qatar’s counterterrorism cooperation was “the worst in the region.”91 Another State Department cable that year indicated that the Qatari government “will continue to be an inconsistent partner on combating terrorist financing, unless continually prodded” and that Doha “has been reluctant to fight terrorist financing for reasons we do not fully understand.”92 In case after case, the Qataris handled suspected terror financiers with half-hearted measures, providing minimal oversight.

“As Clinton noted in her 2009 memo, Qatar’s counterterrorism cooperation was ‘the worst in the region.’”

An illustrative case is the Marri brothers, Qatari citizens detained shortly after 9/11 (one at the Pakistani border and the other in the United States) for their alleged operational role in al-Qaeda, but who were subsequently considered for repatriation back to Qatar.93 For a time, Ali Saleh al-Marri was the only individual held as an enemy combatant on U.S. soil. Court documents claimed KSM chose him to be an al-Qaeda sleeper agent in America, and he reportedly went on to case a number of targets, including U.S. water reservoirs and the New York Stock Exchange.94

His younger brother Jarallah was held at Guantanamo and according to JTF-GTMO arrived at an al-Qaeda camp in Afghanistan just before 9/11, where KSM put him to work as a courier; he was suspected of sending $10,000 in “al-Qaida operational funds” to his brother Ali.95

When the United States requested Ali Marri’s bank records from Qatar in 2008 to aid in the prosecution, the Qataris dug in their heels. They were reportedly angered by Washington’s decision to repatriate another suspected terror financier to Sudan instead of to Qatar and therefore denied the request, at least initially.96 In 2009, Ali accepted a plea bargain in which he admitted to attending terrorist training camps from 1998 to 2001 and being directed by KSM “to enter the United States no later than Sept. 10, 2001” and await further instructions.97

In July of 2008, Ali’s brother Jarallah became the only Qatari citizen repatriated from Guantanamo Bay based on explicit, written assurances provided by Qatar that he would not be permitted to travel outside the country and that Washington would be notified if he

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attempted to do.98 And yet in early 2009, Jarallah appeared in Britain, where he was arrested on his second visit there since leaving Guantanamo.99 While in the U.K., he participated in a speaking tour with fellow Gitmo detainee Moazzam Begg. Britain added Begg to its terrorism blacklist this year and arrested him on accusations of funding and training terrorists in Syria, though he has since been released from jail, and the court case was dropped.100

The U.S. Ambassador to Qatar concluded that Marri’s travel was “almost certainly” the result of a conscious decision involving Qatar’s attorney general.101 The attorney general rejected any implication that he violated a U.S. commitment over Jarallah’s travel, stating that “he was bound only by signed judicial assistance agreements and not diplomatic notes,” but after a “full-court press” by the U.S. ambassador he demurred that Marri would be subject to a six-month renewable travel ban.102 Soon afterwards, the U.S. ambassador to Doha lamented that “the U.S.-Qatar CT [counterterrorism] relationship is not working now and has not worked well for several years.”103 Qatar’s attorney general remains in his position to this day.

Although Qatari officials pledged after Jarallah’s travel to London that he would be kept “under control,” there is little to suggest today that Qatar is keeping him on a tight leash.104 What appears to be Marri’s Twitter account repeatedly publicized a Qatari fundraising campaign called Madid Ahl al-Sham that was reportedly endorsed by the Nusra Front as a fundraising channel for al-Qaeda.105 The Twitter account also recently reposted a message proclaiming “God bless Sheikh Osama bin Laden.”106


106. “Screen shot 2014-10-26 at 12.41.23 PM,” Retweet by @jarallahalmarri, September 27, 2014. (http://defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/dw_photo.pdf)
Khalifa Subaiy

The case of Qatari national Khalifa Mohammed Turki Subaiy was an even greater strain on U.S.-Qatari relations. A onetime employee of Qatar’s Central Bank, Subaiy was identified in 2007 as one of Qatar’s “senior state employees.” Yet in January of 2008, Subaiy was convicted in absentia by Bahrain on charges of financing terrorism, membership in a terrorist organization, undergoing terrorist training, and facilitating for others to do the same.

Several months later, Washington sanctioned him on terror finance charges, with the Treasury Department alleging that Subaiy provided financial support to KSM and al-Qaeda’s senior leadership in Pakistan, served as a diplomatic and communications conduit for the group in the Middle East, and helped move new al-Qaeda recruits to South Asia. Bahrain convicted Subaiy in January, Qatar detained him in March, and Washington designated him in July. But by September, Qatar released him from jail without further charges.

Even before Subaiy’s release, the U.S. chargé d’affaires in Doha reported in 2008 that the case was “a major bilateral irritant for over a year” and that the heads of the CIA, FBI, and Justice had all registered concern with Doha over the case.

After Subaiy’s release from prison the United States quickly initiated his blacklisting at the United Nations, and neither Qatar nor Bahrain objected to the charges, which were comparable to the statements in the U.S. designation. On October 10, 2008, the U.N. Security Council added his name to its al-Qaeda blacklist, which obligated member states to freeze his financial assets. But according to a U.S. cable in March 2009, Qatar’s attorney general argued that “to keep al-Subaie [sic] from continuing his terrorist activities, he needs to be brought back into society,” suggesting that “one way of doing that was to let him have a bank account so he could take care of his family.” Several weeks later, he assured the U.S. that Subaiy was “under control,” subject to surveillance and with all of his bank accounts frozen except for one that would be “monitored/controlled by the Central Bank” (his old employer).

Subaiy was apparently not under control for very long. In September 2014, the U.S. sanctioned two Jordanians with Qatari ID cards that it said worked with Subaiy in 2012 to transfer hundreds of thousands of dollars to al-Qaeda and its senior leaders in Pakistan. According to Qatar’s Interior Ministry, Subaiy still has a valid driver’s license, ID card, and passport. This October, the U.S.

117. Information accessed on October 12, 2014 by entering in
Treasury Department’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen revealed that Subaiy was still among the “residents in Qatar” who “have not been acted against under Qatari law.”

Kuwari and Khawar

Amidst the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011, the U.S. Treasury Department made a dramatic terror finance bust of what it called “the core pipeline through which al-Qa’ida moves money, facilitators and operatives from across the Middle East to South Asia.” Former Deputy National Security Adviser for Combating Terrorism Juan Zarate writes that it was “the most significant al-Qaeda terrorist financing network that had been revealed in the past five years.”

This network reportedly included several high-level financiers channeling funds out of Qatar and Kuwait to al-Qaeda officials in Iran, who in turn passed it on to al-Qaeda senior leadership in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. The one-time head of this al-Qaeda Iran cell, Muhsin al-Fadhli, went on to lead the Khorasan Group in Syria, which U.S. officials accuse of planning mass-casualty terrorist attacks against Western targets.

Two Qatari nationals on this list allegedly channeled these funds to Iran: Salem Hassan Kuwari and Abdullah Ghanim Khawar. According to the Treasury Department’s press release, Kuwari “provided hundreds of thousands of dollars in financial support to al-Qa’ida and has provided funding for al-Qa’ida operations, as well as to secure the release of al-Qa’ida detainees in Iran and elsewhere.” The document also indicated that Khawar “worked with Kuwari to deliver money, messages and other material support to al-Qa’ida elements in Iran. Like Kuwari, Khawar is based in Qatar and has helped facilitate travel for extremists interested in traveling to Afghanistan for jihad.”

Thanks in large part to the work of Nuaymi’s rights group Alkarama, we know a great deal more about Kuwari and Khawar. Alkarama reports reveal that Qatari intelligence detained Kuwari and Khawar in June 2009 until March 2010, and during this period Alkarama raised their case with the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. Alkarama claims that they were hung up, beaten, and subjected to sleep deprivation by Qatari intelligence, all without having been subject to legal proceedings.

Interestingly, Alkarama stated that Kuwari “works in civil protection.” The organization later described him in 2011 as a “civil servant… normally employed at Civil Defense.” Given that Civil Defense is the name of a department within Qatar’s Ministry of the Interior focused on fire safety and disaster first response, it would seem that he returned to his old job after being treated like a security risk in 2009, having been detained without charge and allegedly tortured. This would also suggest that Kuwari worked for the Interior Ministry at the same time it was still directed by KSM’s alleged onetime backer inside the royal family, Abdullah bin Khalid Al Thani.

When Qatar detained Kuwari and Khawar a second time in early 2011, Alkarama raised their case with authorities in Doha and advocated for Kuwari with the same U.N. working group. By the time Alkarama approached the UN in 2011, Khawar had already been re-released. However, Saudi authorities soon arrested him as he was trying to leave Qatar, at which point Alkarama again advocated for Khawar with the U.N. About one week later, the United Nations raised concerns that Saudi Arabia was targeting Khawar for “express[ing] his political views” and issued a joint urgent appeal that was co-signed by the U.N. Special Rapporteurs for Arbitrary Detention, Freedom of Expression, and Torture.

Although Kuwari was blacklisted by the United States in July of 2011, the United Nations reported that he was let free by Qatari authorities that October. Again, the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention reported that Kuwari’s release transpired without formal charges or legal proceedings. The United Nations further urged Qatar’s government to give Kuwari, allegedly one of al-Qaeda’s top financial operatives, financial reparations. According to Qatar’s Ministry of the Civil Defense, he was appointed as a “civil servant… normally employed at Civil Protection.” Interestingly, Alkarama stated that Kuwari “works in civil protection.” The organization later described him in 2011 as a “civil servant… normally employed at Civil Defense.” Given that Civil Defense is the name of a department within Qatar’s Ministry of the Interior focused on fire safety and disaster first response, it would seem that he returned to his old job after being treated like a security risk in 2009, having been detained without charge and allegedly tortured. This would also suggest that Kuwari worked for the Interior Ministry at the same time it was still directed by KSM’s alleged onetime backer inside the royal family, Abdullah bin Khalid Al Thani.

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Interior, Khawar still has an active Qatari passport and ID card.\textsuperscript{135}

Qatar’s Negligence

Some might argue that Doha’s weak measures against terror finance are the result of domestic pressures. This argument simply cannot be defended. As an absolute monarchy, Qatar does not have to bother with the checks and balances of democracy. It has the weakest domestic opposition of any state in the Persian Gulf. When Qatar has encountered meaningful opposition to cracking down on terror finance, frequently that opposition has come from within ruling circles, not from societal forces. If anything, it is the government that appears to be opposed to such action. In Subaiy’s case, the U.S. chargé d’affaires in Doha wrote that Qatar’s prime minister (Washington’s main interlocutor) weighed in on the case “to the consternation, we believe, of Qatar’s security agencies.”\textsuperscript{136} The same U.S. diplomat noted that when Qatar’s attorney general jailed Subaiy for a mere six months, he did so “at the risk of political fallout from other Ministers within the GOQ [Government of Qatar].”\textsuperscript{137}

Nor can Qatar’s negligence be justified on the basis of limited organizational capacity. For one, Qatar has nearly limitless wealth. Should it seek to stand up a system to track terror financiers, it has significant resources to do so. Moreover, neither staffing problems nor weak institutions can explain why Qatar has consistently failed to indict, arrest, convict, and hold behind bars individuals who have been sanctioned by the international community on charges of terror finance. Qatar has withheld data on cases of interest and it has provided designated individuals government-backed platforms. Indeed, Qatar is simply on a different planet when it comes to defining who is or is not a terrorist.\textsuperscript{138}

“Neither staffing problems nor weak institutions can explain why Qatar has consistently failed to indict, arrest, convict, and hold behind bars individuals who have been sanctioned by the international community on charges of terror finance.”

Given that Qatar has been perfectly happy to arrest international human rights researchers and even sentenced a Qatari citizen to life in jail for reading a poem that supported the Arab Spring (his sentence was later commuted to 15 years), it is not unreasonable to expect Doha to charge and lock up terror financiers when presented with credible evidence.\textsuperscript{139} Of course,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{135} Information accessed by entering in the identifying number listed as part of his 2011 U.S. designation (28163402296, which Treasury describes as his passport number but based on its length appears to be his Qatari ID card number) into the Interior Ministry’s online “information and queries” website and then clicking “official documents”: “Information & Queries,” State of Qatar Ministry of the Interior, accessed October 12, 2014; (http://www.moi.gov.qa/site/eServices/services/indexE.html) & U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, “Treasury Targets Key Al-Qa’ida Funding and Support Network Using Iran as a Critical Transit Point,” July 28, 2011. (http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1261.aspx)
  \item \textsuperscript{136} “Scenesetter for Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson’s June 1 Visit to Qatar,” Wikileaks, May 28, 2008. (https://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=08DOHA407&q=khalifa%20subaiy)
  \item \textsuperscript{138} Mick Krever, “Qatar’s Emir: We Don’t Fund Terrorists,” CNN, September 25, 2014 (http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/25/world/meast/qatar-emir/)
\end{itemize}
locking up terrorist financiers is not the only element of tackling illicit finance. But it is difficult to fathom that outside actors actually know more about illicit finance in Qatar than the Qataris themselves; if they did, that would be a worrisome indicator of Qatar’s priorities for intelligence gathering and law enforcement in a principality with less territory and a much smaller population than the state of Connecticut.

“\textit{It is difficult to fathom that outside actors actually know more about illicit finance in Qatar than the Qataris themselves.}”

Similarly, the fact that the Qataris do not implement the regulations they passed (under Western pressure) to combat terror finance also suggests that Doha does yet not care to wage this fight. Qatar authorized the creation of a Financial Intelligence Unit in 2004 and an anti-terrorism committee in 2010 designed to freeze terrorist assets. Yet as of late last year, reports indicated only one suspicious transaction in the entire country was referred to prosecutors by Qatar’s FIU and not a single individual was designated by its anti-terrorism committee.\textsuperscript{140} Recently, a former deputy assistant secretary from the U.S. Treasury even alleged that in 2009 a Qatari official outright lied to him and to the IMF about Doha’s implementation of laws against illicit finance.\textsuperscript{141}

Qatar-based terror finance challenges have metastasized into a pressing, world-class crisis. Individuals taking advantage of Qatar’s “permissive jurisdiction” for terror finance have provided funding in recent years to the leaders of IS, the Khorasan Group, the Nusra Front (under which Khorasan operates), al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Shabaab, the Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and core al-Qaeda in Pakistan, to name just a few. This is a serious problem for U.S. interests that is unlikely to go away without an equally serious change in U.S. policy.


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Dr. Weinberg previously served as a Democratic Professional Staff Member at the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, where he advised the chairman on Middle Eastern politics and U.S. policy toward the region. He also provided research support to staff at the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom and the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff during the George W. Bush administration.

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CSIF seeks to illuminate the critical intersection between the full range of illicit finance and national security, including money laundering, terrorist financing, sanctions evasion, proliferation financing, cyber crime and economic espionage, and corruption and kleptocracy. This includes understanding how America can best use and preserve its financial and economic power to promote its interests and the integrity of the financial system. The Center also examines how America’s adversaries may be leveraging economic tools and power.

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